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Executive Summary 
	
The	 purpose	 of	 this	 report	 is	 to	 map	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 Visegrad	 4	 countries	 (V4;	 the	 Czech	
Republic,	 Hungary,	 Poland	 and	 Slovakia)	 towards	 Brexit	 and	 post-Brexit	 Europe,	 and	 indentify	
similarities	in	the	views	of	the	four	countries	where	they	can	work	together.	Specifically,	the	report	
examines	V4	interests	towards	three	aspects	of	Brexit	and	post-Brexit	Europe:	interests	towards	the	
EU-UK	deal	 itself;	 interests	 related	 to	Brexit-induced	 changes	 in	 the	UK;	 and	 interests	on	EU	 level	
changes	 caused	 by	 Brexit.	 All	 three	 aspects	 are	 analysed	with	 a	 focus	 on	 economic,	 security	 and	
institutional	issues.	
The	 report	 identifies	 a	 number	 of	 similarities	 between	 the	V4’s	 interests,	 especially	 regarding	 the	
EU-UK	deal:	they	are	all	interested	in	developing	a	relationship	with	the	UK	which	is	as	close	to	the	
current	one	as	possible.	The	first	phase	of	Brexit	negotiations	covered	two	issues	which	were	of	key	
importance	for	the	V4:	the	rights	of	citizens	and	the	UK’s	financial	contribution,	both	of	which	were	
settled	to	the	satisfaction	of	the	V4.	However,	the	second	phase	of	negotiations,	focusing	on	future	
trade	and	transition	arrangements,	is	likely	to	lead	to	greater	confrontation,	and	can	potentially	be	
even	more	divisive.	The	UK	is	a	significant	trading	partner	for	all	V4	(with	the	possible	exception	of	
Slovakia),	and	ensuring	continued	access	to	the	British	market	for	goods	and	services	is	a	strong	V4	
interest.	 The	 V4	 would	 like	 to	 see	 Britain	 remain	 a	 part	 of	 the	 single	 market,	 and	 if	 that	 is	 not	
possible,	 they	would	prefer	 a	deep	 free	 trade	deal	which	 also	 covers	 services.	Mechanisms	which	
ensure	that	there	is	no	long	term	divergence	between	the	single	market	and	the	UK	would	also	be	
welcomed	by	the	V4.	Furthermore,	the	V4	have	strong	interests	in	not	letting	the	UK	leave	without	a	
deal,	 which	 would	 mean	 that	 the	 agreement	 on	 citizen’s	 rights	 reached	 in	 the	 first	 phase	 of	
negotiations	would	become	void.	The	V4	have	so	far	subscribed	to	the	EU’s	joint	negotiating	position	
and	have	not	made	attempts	 to	undermine	 it,	but	 the	second	phase	can	 test	 this	unity.	However,	
unity	has	paid	off	 in	 the	 first	 phase,	 and	 thus	 it	 is	 in	 the	best	 interest	of	 the	V4,	 and	 the	EU	as	 a	
whole,	to	remain	united	during	the	second	phase	as	well.	
The	UK	has	been	a	strong	ally	on	many	policy	 fronts	 for	 the	V4	since	their	accession,	 including	EU	
foreign	 and	 security	 policy,	 relations	with	 the	 Eastern	 neighbours,	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 between	
eurozone	members	and	non-members,	or	policies	 related	 to	 regulation	and	competition.	The	UK’s	
departure	 is	 therefore	 a	 great	 blow	 to	 these	 countries.	 If	 there	 is	 political	 will,	 some	 EU	 policies	
could	be	opened	up	for	participation	of	outside	countries,	and	such	participation	may	be	in	the	long	
term	interest	of	the	UK	as	well.	The	V4	countries	need	to	analyse	and	judge	which	policy	areas	are	of	
vital	 importance	 for	 them	 in	 terms	 involving	 the	UK,	and	could	 initiate	efforts	 to	develop	EU-level	
frameworks	for	cooperation	after	Brexit.	Ensuring	that	the	UK	remains	close	to	the	EU	is	especially	
important	 in	 terms	 of	 security,	 including	 military	 aspects,	 but	 also	 cooperation	 on	 intelligence	
gathering	and	information	sharing.	While	the	UK	has	not	questioned	its	commitments	towards	the	
continent’s	security	 in	 the	 framework	of	NATO,	 the	V4	must	make	sure	that	any	deeper	European	
cooperation	in	defence	does	not	become	a	competitor	to	NATO.		
V4	interests	seem	to	diverge	when	it	comes	to	the	specifics	of	post-Brexit	Europe.	The	V4	are	divided	
on	how	to	approach	EU-level	changes	post-Brexit,	and	it	is	unclear	whether	these	differences	can	be	
reconciled.	Slovakia	has	adopted	the	euro,	and	has	expressed	a	desire	to	belong	to	the	core	of	the	
EU,	 while	 the	 Czech	 population	 is	 highly	 Eurosceptic,	 as	 are	 the	 current	 Polish	 and	 Hungarian	
governments.	 The	 deepening	 of	 the	 integration,	 perhaps	 in	 a	 multispeed	 fashion,	 will	 become	 a	
reality	 after	 Brexit,	 something	 which	 the	 V4	 have	 generally	 opposed,	 due	 to	 a	 fear	 of	 being	 left	
behind.	With	 the	V4	not	 fully	 united,	 building	 coalitions	will	 be	difficult,	 and	without	 the	UK,	 it	 is	
unclear	who	exactly	the	natural	allies	of	the	V4	will	be.	Implementing	V4	interests	in	post-Brexit	EU	
will	require	much	stronger	efforts	and	highly	skilled	diplomacy.	 	
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1. Introduction 
	
On	the	23rd	of	June	2016	the	electorate	of	the	United	Kingdom	voted	to	leave	the	European	Union	
(EU).	 The	withdrawal	of	one	of	 its	 largest	member	 states	poses	unprecedented	 challenges	 for	 the	
EU,	and	will	have	long	term	impacts	on	the	future	of	the	integration.	While	in	December	2017	the	UK	
and	the	EU	agreed	on	the	outlines	of	three	key	issues	(the	“divorce	bill”,	citizen’s	rights,	and	the	Irish	
border),	 it	 is	 still	 unclear	 how	 Brexit	 will	 play	 out,	 and	 what	 exact	 shape	 political	 and	 economic	
relations	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 UK	 will	 take	 after	 the	 negotiations.	 In	 the	 time	 since	 the	
referendum,	 a	 widely	 shared	 perception	 has	 emerged	 that	 nothing	 is	 certain,	 and	 positions	 can	
evolve	rapidly.	A	key	interest	of	the	EU	is	to	ensure	its	own	survival,	and	perhaps	use	the	upheaval	
caused	by	Brexit	to	change	the	course	of	integration.	A	close	and	constructive	relationship	between	
the	 EU	 and	 the	 UK	 is	 in	 the	 best	 interest	 of	 all,	 but	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 EU	 is	 prioritizing	 its	 own	
stability	 and	 survival	 during	 the	negotiations,	 and	has	 not	 been	 accommodative	 towards	 the	UK’s	
interests.	
Different	 member	 states	 of	 the	 EU	 have	 different	 interests	 towards	 the	 Brexit	 process.	 Some	
countries	have	stronger	economic	relations	with	the	UK	than	others,	and	some	have	relied	on	the	UK	
as	 a	 predictable	 ally	 in	 the	 EU’s	 decision	 making	 processes.	 There	 are	 also	 countries	 with	 highly	
specific	interests:	the	Republic	of	Ireland	for	example	is	the	only	member	state	to	have	a	land	border	
with	the	UK,	and	has	a	key	interest	in	keeping	that	border	open.	There	is	increasing	talk	about	closer	
integration	 among	 remaining	 EU	 members,	 which	 some	 countries	 oppose.	 How	 the	 Brexit	
negotiations,	now	 in	their	second	phase,	evolve,	what	shape	post-Brexit	UK-EU	relations	take,	and	
what	kind	of	EU	emerges	from	the	process	are	therefore	clearly	vital	issues	for	the	member	states.		
While	it	is	the	European	Commission	(EC)	which	leads	the	negotiations,	its	mandate	comes	from	the	
member	states.	Member	states	have	informal	influence	throughout	the	process,	and	all	of	them	will	
need	to	agree	to	and	ratify	any	new	trade	agreement	with	the	UK.	Understanding	the	 interests	of	
specific	member	states,	as	well	as	groups	of	member	states	is	therefore	important	in	getting	insight	
into	how	the	final	deal	with	the	UK,	as	well	as	the	EU’s	future	may	evolve.	Smaller	member	states	
may	need	 to	work	 together	 to	be	 able	 to	 influence	 the	 final	 outcome	of	 the	negotiations	 in	 their	
favour.	For	such	alliances	to	be	possible,	members	need	to	identify	their	areas	of	common	interest,	
and	work	together	to	make	these	visible	during	the	negotiation	process.	
Given	this	context,	the	report	focuses	on	investigating	the	interests	of	the	Visegrad	Four	(V4,	i.e.	the	
Czech	Republic,	Hungary,	Poland	and	Slovakia)	 towards	Brexit	 and	post-Brexit	Europe.	 Specifically,	
the	report	addresses	two	main	questions:		
1. What	kind	of	post-Brexit	Europe	are	the	V4	countries	interested	in?	
2. Are	 there	 similarities	 in	 the	 views	 of	 the	 four	 countries,	 and	 can	 they	 work	 together	 to	
achieve	their	goals?	
The	report	therefore	provides	a	comparative	mapping	of	V4	interests	towards	Brexit.	Specifically,	it	
examines	V4	interests	towards	three	aspects	of	Brexit	and	post-Brexit	Europe:	interests	towards	the	
EU-UK	deal	 itself;	 interests	 related	 to	Brexit-induced	 changes	 in	 the	UK;	 and	 interests	on	EU	 level	
changes	 caused	 by	 Brexit.	 All	 three	 aspects	 are	 analysed	with	 a	 focus	 on	 economic,	 security	 and	
institutional	issues.	
Overall,	the	report	finds	that	there	are	strong	similarities	between	how	the	V4	approach	Brexit	and	
post-Brexit	 Europe,	 but	 also	 some	 key	differences.	Due	 to	 interests	 related	 to	 trade,	 the	 rights	 of	
their	citizens	living	in	the	UK,	and	the	fact	that	they	have	seen	the	UK	as	a	major	ally	in	EU	decision	
making,	 all	 V4	 countries	 favour	maintaining	 a	 close	 relationship,	 preferably	 keeping	 the	UK	 in	 the	
single	market.	The	V4	are	also	open	to	involving	the	UK	in	certain	EU	policies.	However,	they	have	
also	 valued	 the	 unity	 of	 the	 remaining	 27	member	 states,	 and	 neither	 of	 the	 V4	 have	 given	 any	
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indications	 that	 they	would	be	willing	 to	break	 it.	V4	 interests	however	seem	to	diverge	regarding	
the	future	of	the	EU	after	Brexit.	
Although	 the	 report	 does	 not	 aim	 to	 study	 Brexit	 itself,	 Section	 2	 nonetheless	 briefly	 discusses	
potential	scenarios	for	Brexit	in	order	to	provide	context.	Section	3	presents	the	methodology	used	
in	the	report,	including	the	approach	to	the	analysis	and	details	on	how	data	was	collected.	Section	4	
presents	 the	 findings	 for	 each	 of	 the	 four	 Visegrad	 countries,	 and	 Section	 5	 discusses	 the	 main	
themes	and	provides	recommendations	on	areas	where	joint	actions	would	be	possible.	
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2. What kind of Brexit? 
	
The	exit	negotiations	between	the	UK	and	the	EU	officially	began	on	the	19th	of	June	2017,	and	the	
final	 exit	 deal	 needs	 to	 be	 agreed	 and	 ratified	 by	March	 2019,	 as	 per	 article	 50	 of	 the	 Treaty	 on	
European	Union,	which	sets	a	two	year	deadline.	Despite	the	tight	deadline,	the	UK	government	has	
been	extremely	vague	in	formally	setting	out	the	exact	kind	of	relationship	it	wants	with	the	EU.	The	
vote	 in	 favour	 of	 leaving	 the	 EU	 most	 likely	 took	 the	 political	 establishment,	 and	 even	 those	
campaigning	 for	 Brexit,	 by	 surprise.	Many	 of	 the	 leading	 figures	 promoting	 Brexit	 clearly	 did	 not	
grasp,	or	choose	to	ignore,	the	complexity	of	unravelling	more	than	40	years	of	integration,	and	how	
this	could	impact	the	UK.	Divisions	within	the	governing	Conservative	Party	have	remained	after	the	
referendum.	 The	 government,	 and	 especially	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 Theresa	 May,	 was	 significantly	
weakened	after	the	snap	election	she	had	called	for	the	8th	of	June	2017	to	strengthen	her	position	
spectacularly	backfired,	stripping	the	party	of	its	parliamentary	majority.	Many	have	also	questioned	
the	capacities	of	the	civil	service	to	plan	and	prepare	for	Brexit.	Years	of	austerity,	especially	under	
David	Cameron’s	governments,	have	hit	the	civil	service	hard,	and	it	has	clearly	lacked	the	sufficient	
number	of	well-trained	experts	to	deal	with	the	monumental	task	of	Brexit.	Many	policy	areas	vital	
for	 negotiating	 Brexit,	 especially	 international	 trade,	 have	 found	 themselves	 short	 of	 British	
expertise,	given	that	the	policy	area	was	EU	competence.	
These	 factors	 all	 impeded	 the	 government	 in	 forming	 a	 clear	 position	 on	 its	 exact	 preferences	
relating	to	the	terms	of	Brexit,	and	the	relations	it	would	like	with	the	EU	afterwards.	A	lack	of	clear	
British	positions	was	one	of	the	key	inhibitors	during	the	first	phase	of	negotiations,	which	focused	
on	the	financial	liabilities	of	the	UK	towards	the	EU	(the	“divorce	bill”);	the	future	position	and	rights	
of	 EU	 citizens	 living	 in	 the	UK	 and	UK	 citizens	 living	 in	 the	 EU;	 and	 the	border	 between	Northern	
Ireland	and	the	Republic	of	Ireland.	The	EU’s	common	negotiating	position	for	this	first	phase	on	the	
other	hand	was	clear,	and	accepted	by	all	member	states	in	a	resolution	of	the	Council	of	the	EU.1	
Due	 to	 the	 lack	of	clarity	on	 the	British	side,	 the	negotiations	 in	 the	 first	phase	 lasted	 longer	 than	
expected,	 and	 were	 only	 closed	 in	 December	 2017.	 A	 relatively	 specific	 agreement	 was	 reached	
regarding	the	future	rights	of	EU	nationals,	which	basically	allows	them	to	stay	in	the	UK	after	Brexit.	
The	UK’s	offer	on	how	it	will	meet	its	financial	liabilities	has	also	been	accepted,	however	the	details	
on	the	 Irish	border	remain	vague	and	specifying	them	in	 legal	terms	can	still	 lead	to	confrontation	
later	on.	
Nonetheless,	as	of	January	2018,	negotiations	have	progressed	into	their	second	phase,	focusing	on	
the	 future	 trade	 relation	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 UK,	 as	 well	 as	 details	 of	 any	
transition/implementation	periods.	Several	scenarios	have	been	put	forward	in	the	past	years	on	the	
types	of	trade	relationships	the	UK	might	develop	with	the	EU	post-Brexit,	mostly	modelled	on	the	
EU’s	 currently	 existing	 relationships	 with	 third	 countries.	 The	 most	 important	 of	 these	 are	 the	
following:2	
• EFTA/Norway	model:	Three	of	the	members	of	the	European	Free	Trade	Association	(EFTA),	
Norway,	 Liechtenstein	 and	 Iceland,	 participate	 in	 the	 European	 Economic	Area	 (EEA).	 This	
mechanism	 allows	 them	 generous	 access	 to	 the	 EU’s	 single	 market,	 although	 with	 some	
restrictions.	 They	 must	 accept	 all	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 single	 market;	 however,	 they	 have	 no	
formal	influence	in	making	these	rules.	They	must	also	accept	the	four	freedoms	of	the	EU,	
including	 the	 free	movement	 of	 people.	 EEA	members	must	 also	 pay	 into	 the	 EU	budget.	
																																								 																				
1	Council	of	the	EU	(2017):	Annex	1	to	the	Council	decision	authorising	the	opening	of	negotiations	with	the	United	Kingdom	
of	Great	Britain	and	Northern	Ireland	for	an	agreement	setting	out	the	arrangements	for	its	withdrawal	from	the	European	
Union.	21009/17	BXT	16	ADD	1.	
2	For	more	details,	see	Borońska-Hryniewiecka,	K.	et	al.	 (2016):	Probable	EU-UK	Relationship	after	Brexit.	Perspectives	of	
Germany,	France,	Italy,	Spain	and	Poland.	Warsaw:	Polish	Institute	of	International	Affairs	
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Simply	put,	the	EFTA/Norway	model	is	the	closest	to	EU	membership	among	the	models	the	
UK	could	choose	from,	but	without	the	benefit	of	being	able	to	directly	influence	EU	decision	
making.		
• Switzerland	model:	 Switzerland	 also	 enjoys	 the	benefits	 of	 being	 able	 to	 access	 the	 single	
market,	although	with	even	more	restrictions	than	in	case	of	the	other	EFTA	countries.	Some	
services	for	example	are	excluded,	and	there	are	limitations	for	agricultural	products	as	well.	
Access	 is	 based	on	 about	120	 standalone	 treaties,	 each	 regulating	 relationships	 in	 specific	
sectors.	Switzerland	also	contributes	to	the	EU	budget	and	has	generally	respected	the	free	
movement	 of	 people.	 While	 the	 sectoral	 treaties	 are	 static	 in	 nature,	 Switzerland	 has	
generally	tended	to	implement	EU	rules	into	its	own	laws,	which	has	been	seen	as	necessary	
to	 ensure	 seamless	 access	 to	 the	 single	market.	 Needless	 to	 say,	 just	 like	 the	 other	 EFTA	
countries,	it	has	no	influence	on	making	these	rules.	
• Turkey	model:	Turkey	forms	a	customs	union	with	the	EU,	but	it	is	not	in	the	single	market.	It	
has	 access	 to	 the	 single	 market	 for	 manufacturing	 products,	 but	 not	 for	 unprocessed	
agricultural	products	or	services.	It	can	enter	into	trade	agreements	with	third	countries,	but	
needs	to	keep	its	external	tariffs	on	the	same	level	as	the	EU.	There	are	no	requirements	for	
the	free	movement	of	people.	
• Canada	model:	 Canada	 has	 negotiated	 a	 new	 generation	 free	 trade	 deal	with	 the	 EU,	 the	
Comprehensive	 Economic	 and	 Trade	 Agreement	 (CETA),	 which	 entered	 into	 force	
provisionally	in	September	2017.	This	provides	access	for	Canada	to	the	EU’s	single	market,	
but	 there	 are	many	 limitations	 in	 case	 of	 agriculture	 and	 services,	 as	 well	 as	 some	 other	
industries.	There	are	no	requirements	 for	 the	 free	movement	of	people.	 It	 is	worth	noting	
that	the	EU	has	similar	free	trade	agreements	in	place	with	a	number	of	other	countries	as	
well,	and	is	negotiating	many	further	ones.	
• WTO	model:	Third	countries	which	do	not	have	any	agreement	with	the	EU	trade	with	the	
community	according	to	the	rules	of	the	World	Trade	Organization	(WTO).	This	means	tariffs	
for	 all	 products,	 which	 are	 relatively	 small	 in	 case	 of	manufactured	 goods	 and	 higher	 for	
agricultural	ones.	Access	for	services	is	very	limited	under	these	rules.	It	is	possible	that	the	
UK	exits	the	EU	without	any	kind	of	agreement,	and	WTO	rules	would	thus	be	the	fall-back	
option	for	regulating	UK-EU	trade.		
Maintaining	a	close	relationship	with	the	EU,	for	example	by	staying	in	the	single	market,	has	been	
labelled	a	‘soft	Brexit’.	Any	solution	which	involves	 leaving	the	single	market	has	been	classified	as	
‘hard	Brexit’,	although	many	pro-Brexit	politicians	and	commentators	have	preferred	the	term	‘clean	
Brexit’	 instead.	 Others	 have	 differentiated	 between	 an	 ‘orderly’	 and	 a	 ‘chaotic’	 Brexit,	 with	 the	
former	referring	to	the	UK	leaving	the	EU	with	a	deal	regulating	the	exit	and	their	future	relationship	
in	place,	while	the	latter	meaning	that	the	UK	leaves	with	no	deal.	
By	 September	 2017,	 the	 British	 government	 has	 made	 it	 clear	 that	 neither	 of	 these	 models	 is	
appropriate	 and	 it	 aims	 to	 develop	 a	 new,	 unique	 kind	 of	 partnership	 with	 the	 EU.	 Some	 key	
elements	of	this	new	partnership,	at	least	according	to	the	UK’s	position,	have	emerged	by	January	
2018,	 although	 specifics	 are	 still	 lacking.	 Theresa	 May’s	 government	 has	 been	 prioritizing	 the	
reduction	of	EU	immigration	to	the	UK,3	which	 is	clearly	 incompatible	with	any	form	of	soft	Brexit.	
The	European	 institutions,	as	well	 as	a	number	of	 leading	EU	politicians	have	made	 it	 clear	 that	a	
country	cannot	have	 full	access	 to	the	single	market	 if	 it	does	not	allow	the	 free	movement	of	EU	
citizens.	According	 to	 the	UK	government,	 any	new	 relationship	will	 have	 to	 allow	 the	UK	 to	 take	
back	 control	 over	 who	 it	 allows	 into	 the	 country.	 Proposals	 put	 forward	 by	 the	 UK	 for	 a	 new	
immigration	regime	have	been	seen	as	highly	restrictive,	although	many	have	questioned	whether	it	
can	really	work	in	practice,	given	the	chronic	skills	shortages	of	the	British	economy.4	
																																								 																				
3	The	Telegraph	(2017):	Theresa	May	commits	Tories	to	cutting	net	migration	to	the	UK	to	the	tens	of	thousands.	20	April.	
4	The	Guardian	(2017):	Theresa	May	defends	new	EU	immigration	controls	after	Brexit	leak.	6	September.	
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A	second	priority	 for	 the	Conservative	government	 is	ending	 the	 jurisdiction	of	 the	ECJ,	which	has	
been	seen	as	intruding	on	the	UK’s	legal	system.5	This	priority	is	also	incompatible	with	single	market	
membership,	 given	 the	ECJ’s	 role	as	 the	ultimate	arbiter	of	 the	 rules	governing	 the	 single	market.	
However,	the	ECJ	does	not	have	jurisdiction	in	the	EFTA	countries	either,	and	a	separate	court,	the	
EFTA	court,	has	been	created	to	supervise	the	EEA	agreement.	There	is	thus	room	for	a	compromise	
on	this	issue.	A	third	priority	is	to	allow	the	government	to	negotiate	trade	deals	on	its	own	without	
any	 kind	 of	 restrictions.	 Brexit-backing	 politicians	 have	 emphasized	 the	 UK’s	 need	 to	 diversify	 its	
trade	relationships,	including	building	stronger	relationships	with	emerging	economies.6	This	interest	
is	 again	 incompatible	with	 staying	 in	 the	 single	market,	 although	 the	EU	 itself	 is	 in	 the	process	of	
building	a	global	network	of	free	trade	agreements.	
These	 three	 red	 lines	 aside,	 the	 government	has	 generally	been	 clear	on	 the	 fact	 that	 it	wants	 as	
favourable	access	to	the	single	market	as	possible.	This	would,	 ideally,	not	only	 include	frictionless	
trade	 in	 goods,	 but	 also	 continued	 access	 in	 terms	 of	 services,	 especially	 financial	 and	 business	
services,	in	which	the	UK	is	a	world	leader.	The	border	between	the	Republic	of	Ireland	and	Northern	
Ireland	should	also	be	kept	as	free	and	open	as	possible.	This	model	of	future	relationship	preferred	
by	the	UK	has	been	labelled	by	David	Davis,	the	Secretary	of	State	for	Exiting	the	European	Union,	as	
the	“CETA+++”.7	The	UK	government	acknowledges	that	negotiating	such	a	complex	deal	will	not	be	
easy,	 and	 that	 a	 transition	 period	 will	 be	 necessary.	 In	 her	 Florence	 speech	 in	 September	 2017,	
Theresa	May	asked	for	a	transition	period	of	up	to	two	years.	She	also	acknowledged	that	the	UK	will	
continue	paying	into	the	EU	budget	until	the	end	of	this	period.8	Beyond	these	key	issues,	a	number	
of	questions	emerge	for	each	policy	area,	ranging	from	internal	security	to	fisheries	policy.	The	UK	
government	has	put	forward	details	on	some	of	these,	but	has	been	vague	on	others.	For	example,	
in	 January	2018	 it	has	confirmed	a	willingness	to	participate	 in	the	planned	European	 Intervention	
Initiative	promoted	by	French	President	Emmanuel	Macron.9	
The	 government’s	 preference	 towards	 a	 CETA+++	 arrangement	 can,	 however,	 change,	 given	 the	
weakness	of	May’s	government,	which	does	not	have	an	absolute	majority	in	Parliament,	and	relies	
on	 the	 support	 of	 a	Northern	 Irish	party,	 the	Democratic	Unionist	 Party.	May’s	 authority	 has	 also	
been	challenged	on	 several	occasions	by	politicians	preferring	a	hard	Brexit	within	her	own	party,	
and	 even	 her	 own	 cabinet.	 The	 main	 opposition	 party,	 the	 Labour	 Party,	 officially	 also	 supports	
leaving	 the	single	market	and	 the	need	 to	prioritize	 immigration,	although	 it	emphasizes	 that	 jobs	
need	to	be	protected.10	There	however	seems	to	be	rising	popular	sentiment	for	staying	in	the	single	
market,	 and	 a	 number	 of	 influential	 voices	 have	 called	 for	 this,	 and	 even	 for	 the	 full	 reversal	 of	
Brexit.	A	large	number	of	Members	of	Parliament	(MP),	both	in	the	Conservative	and	especially	the	
Labour	Party,	have	voted	 for	 remaining	 in	 the	EU.	A	 change	 in	 the	position	of	 the	 Labour	party	 is	
therefore	not	impossible.		
It	 is	 also	 unclear	 how	 realistic	 the	 UK’s	 aspirations	 towards	 a	 CETA+++	 deal	 are.	 The	 EU	 has	
emphasized	that	it	does	not	want	to	develop	new	partnership	frameworks,	and	the	UK	must	choose	
from	the	existing	models.	EU	politicians	have	insisted	that	the	UK	cannot	“cherry	pick”,	or	“have	its	
cake	 and	 eat	 it.”11	 The	 EU	 clearly	wants	 to	 avoid	 a	 situation	 in	which	 an	 exiting	 state	 achieves	 a	
better	position	in	its	relations	with	the	community	than	it	had	as	a	member.		 	
																																								 																				
5	 Politico.eu	 (2017a):	 Continued	 EU	 court	 oversight	 means	 no	 Brexit,	 says	 former	 UK	 minister.	
https://www.politico.eu/article/continued-eu-court-oversight-means-no-brexit-says-former-uk-minister/	
6	 Yueh,	 L.	 (2017):	 ‘Global	 Britain’:	 the	 trade	 strategies	 the	 UK	 could	 pursue	 after	 Brexit.	 LSE	 Blog,	
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/10/02/global-britain-the-trade-strategies-the-uk-could-pursue-after-brexit/	
7	The	Telegraph	(2017):	Britain	should	sign	a	'Canada-plus	plus	plus'	trade	deal	with	the	EU	after	Brexit.	10	December.	
8	The	Guardian	(2017):	Brexit	transition	period	should	end	on	31	December	2020,	says	EU.	20	December.	
9	 UK	 Government	 (2017a):	 UK	 and	 France	 commit	 to	 new	 defence	 cooperation.	 Press	 Release,	 18	 January.	
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-france-commit-to-new-defence-cooperation	
10	Mandelson,	P.	(2017):	Single	market	and	customs	union	essential	for	a	Labour	Brexit.	Financial	Times,	16	December.	
11	The	Guardian	(2017):	Britain’s	cake-and-eat-it	Brexit	routine	wears	thin	with	Barnier.	31	August.	
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3. Methodology 
	
In	order	to	identify	the	interests	and	preferences	of	the	V4	countries	towards	Brexit	and	post-Brexit	
Europe,	 the	 report	 uses	 a	 two-dimensional	 matrix	 framework.	 The	 first	 dimension	 of	 the	 matrix	
refers	 to	 the	 impact	 areas	 of	 Brexit,	 and	 breaks	 down	 V4	 country	 interests	 into	 three	 groups:	
interests	 towards	 the	Brexit	 deal	 itself,	 interests	 related	 to	Brexit-induced	 changes	 in	 the	UK,	 and	
interests	 towards	 Brexit-induced	 changes	 in	 the	 EU.	 The	 second	 dimension	 of	 the	 matrix	
differentiates	the	economic,	security-related	and	institutional	aspects	of	the	three	groups	in	the	first	
dimension	(see	Table	1).	
The	columns	in	Table	1	refer	to	three	impact	areas	of	Brexit.	First,	the	UK	will	leave	the	EU,	and	this	
divorce	will	 have	 specific	 terms.	 Three	 of	 these	 divorce	 issues	 have	 now	 been	 settled	 in	 the	 first	
phase	 of	 negotiations	 (citizen’s	 rights,	 the	 Irish	 border	 and	 the	 size	 of	 the	 UK’s	 financial	
commitments),	but	many	further	issues	remain,	especially	regarding	trade	and	future	relations.	It	is	
hoped	 that	 the	 UK	 will	 be	 able	 to	 conclude	 a	 formal	 agreement	 with	 the	 EU	 regulating	 their	
relationship	 in	 these	 policy	 areas.	 The	 V4	 countries	 will	 have	 specific	 interests	 towards	 this	
agreement	 and	 any	 further	 agreements	 that	 are	 to	 follow	 it.	 Second,	 Brexit	 will	 induce	 (and	 has	
already	induced)	a	number	of	changes	 in	the	UK,	which	will	have	international	 implications.	British	
politicians	have	stated	 their	 intentions	 to	orientate	 the	 trade	 relations	of	 their	 country	away	 from	
Europe.	Brexit	can	also	provoke	constitutional	crises	in	the	UK,	with	Scotland	expressing	a	renewed	
push	towards	independence	and	the	potential	re-ignition	of	the	‘troubles’	in	Northern	Ireland.	While	
less	direct,	these	changes	in	the	UK’s	foreign	and	domestic	politics	all	have	potential	impacts	on	the	
V4	countries.	Third,	the	EU	itself	will	undergo	a	number	of	changes	due	to	Brexit.	With	the	loss	of	a	
large	 and	 influential	 member,	 power	 dynamics	 will	 shift	 in	 several	 areas:	 resistance	 to	 further	
integration	 may	 weaken,	 calls	 for	 a	 multispeed	 EU	 strengthen,	 greater	 pressures	 may	 arise	 for	
tighter	cooperation	in	the	field	of	defence,	and	the	Economic	and	Monetary	Union	will	become	more	
influential,	among	others.	Formal	decision	making	processes	will	also	need	to	be	altered,	and	such	
changes	 have	 always	 been	 controversial	 in	 the	 past.	 Indeed,	 many	 such	 processes	 have	 already	
become	 visible,	 for	 example	 French	 President	 Emmanuel	 Macron’s	 push	 for	 a	 greater	 degree	 of	
federalism	within	the	EU.	The	V4	countries	need	to	be	prepared	for	these	changes.	
The	 rows	 in	 Table	 1	 refer	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 all	 three	 Brexit	 impact	 areas	 have	 economic,	 security-
related,	and	 institutional	aspects.	Economic	 issues	 include	aspects	 related	 to	 the	 four	 freedoms	of	
the	EU,	and	how	Brexit	 and	 its	 consequences	will	 impact	 these.	They	also	 include	 financial	 issues.	
Security-related	aspects	focus	on	how	the	European	security	architecture	(both	in	terms	of	internal	
security	 and	 external,	 military	 security)	 will	 change	 due	 to	 Brexit.	 Institutional	 aspects	 include	 a	
broad	range	of	 issues	relating	to	how	the	EU	engages	with	the	UK	in	the	future,	and	how	the	EU’s	
internal	 workings	 and	 dynamics	 will	 transform.	 The	 individual	 cells	 in	 the	 matrix	 feature	 specific	
impacts	and	policy	developments	towards	which	the	V4	countries	may	have	interests.		
The	importance	of	these	specific	impacts	will	be	analyzed	individually	for	each	of	the	V4	countries	in	
Section	 4,	 with	 the	 goal	 of	 identifying	 which	 areas	 have	 been	 seen	 as	 crucial	 for	 each	 of	 the	
countries,	and	whether	there	are	commonalities	and	differences.	Table	1	includes	a	large	number	of	
potential	 issues	 towards	which	 the	V4	countries	can	have	 interests.	This	of	 course	does	not	mean	
that	 the	 political	 establishments	 in	 the	 four	 countries	 have	 given	 equal	 weight	 to	 these.	 Indeed,	
some	 issues	may	be	seen	as	more	 important	 than	others,	and	some	may	not	have	 received	much	
attention	 at	 all.	 The	 relative	 importance	 of	 the	 impacts	 for	 the	 V4	will	 differ,	 and	 thus	 how	 they	
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prioritize	 interests	 clearly	 matters.	 This	 is	 especially	 important	 in	 terms	 of	 identifying	 common	
interests	and	areas	for	cooperation.	
Data	from	a	number	of	different	sources	has	been	used	to	identify	the	interests	of	the	V4	countries	
along	the	lines	of	Table	1.	Detailed	statistics	have	mainly	been	used	on	economic	interests,	including	
trade,	investments	and	migration,	which	can	show	the	relative	important	of	the	UK	for	each	of	the	
V4	in	these	fields.	Statistics	have	been	collected	from	the	OECD’s	databases,	unless	otherwise	noted.	
A	large	portion	of	V4	interests	towards	Brexit	however	cannot	be	quantified,	and	thus	a	number	of	
different	 qualitative	 data	 sources	 were	 also	 used.	 First,	 these	 include	 written	 sources	 like	
government	statements,	speeches,	position	papers,	media	reports,	and	any	existing	analysis	on	the	
topic.	These	documents	have	been	analyzed	with	the	view	of	identifying	government	positions	and	
discourses	on	the	specific	impacts	of	Brexit.	Second,	qualitative	interviews	have	been	carried	out	in	
all	four	Visegrad	countries.	Interviewees	have	included	senior	civil	servants,	mainly	in	the	Ministries	
of	Foreign	Affairs	of	the	four	countries,	but	also	economic	and	political	experts.	The	purpose	of	the	
interviews	was	twofold.	First,	to	collect	data	on	any	aspects	of	the	impact	areas	on	which	qualitative	
and	 quantitative	 data	 were	 not	 readily	 available;	 and	 second,	 to	 gauge	 the	 perceptions	 these	
decision	makers	have	about	the	relative	importance	of	the	various	issues	identified.	Interviews	were	
conducted	between	mid-October	2017	and	early-January	2018.	Due	to	this	timing,	which	coincided	
with	 the	 final	 stretch	 of	 the	 first	 phase	 of	 Brexit	 negotiations,	 most	 respondents	 were	
understandably	 focused	on	 the	 topics	 covered	during	 this	phase,	 although	 significant	efforts	were	
made	 to	 elicit	 responses	 on	 the	 wider	 impacts	 of	 Brexit.	 Due	 to	 reasons	 of	 confidentiality,	 all	
interviewees	remain	anonymous.		
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4. Findings 
4.1. Czech Republic 
4.1.1.  The Czech Republ ic  and the EU 
The	European	policy	of	the	Czech	Republic	is	at	a	crossroads	and	under	pressure	from	contradicting	
factors.	 The	 country	 has	 an	 open	 economy,	 situated	 at	 the	 geographical	 centre	 of	 the	 European	
Union,	yet	the	rising	Euroscepticism	of	the	Czech	population	prevents	the	country	from	making	the	
next	 step	 in	economic	 integration:	 joining	 the	 third	phase	of	 the	EMU,	 i.e.	adopting	 the	euro.	The	
Czech	 Republic	 joined	 the	 EU	with	 the	 expectation	 of	 “returning	 to	 Europe”	 and	 becoming	 a	 full,	
normal	 member	 of	 the	 European	 family	 of	 nations.	 However,	 at	 the	 moment,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	
country	does	not	know	whether	 it	wants	to	adopt	the	euro	and	become	a	part	of	the	“integration	
core”.	The	Czech	Republic	has	been	maintaining	a	perpetual	“wait-and-see”	policy	vis-à-vis	the	euro	
and	other	euro-related	initiatives	like	the	fiscal	union	or	the	banking	union.	
The	widening	gap	between	“Western”	and	“Eastern”	EU	member	states	represents	another,	albeit	
related	 challenge	 for	 the	 Czech	 Republic.	 The	 Eastern	 EU	 enlargement	 in	 2004	 was	 meant	 to	
symbolize	 the	 end	 to	 the	 Cold	War	 division	 between	Western	 and	 Eastern	 Europe.	 However,	 the	
backsliding	of	democratic	standards	among	the	V4	member	states	revived	the	negative	connotations	
traditionally	 associated	 with	 the	 “Eastern	 bloc”:	 autocratic	 government	 and	 closed	 society.	 The	
Czech	Republic	has	tried	to	play	a	moderating	role	within	the	V4	and	serve	as	a	bridge	between	the	
more	 Eurosceptic	 governments	 of	 Poland	 and	 Hungary	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 the	 EU	mainstream	
(mainly	Germany)	 on	 the	other	 hand.	 The	 recent	 push	 for	 deeper	 European	 security	 cooperation,	
enthusiastically	supported	by	the	Czech	government,	is	an	attempt	to	bridge	the	East-West	divide	by	
deepening	 the	 integration	 in	 an	 area	 of	 common	 interest.	 But	 the	 Czech	 government’s	mediating	
efforts	are	complicated	by	the	fact	that	the	Czech	population	is	far	more	Eurosceptic	than	publics	in	
the	other	V4	countries	(see	Figure	1).	
	
Figure	1.	Public	image	of	the	EU	in	the	V4	countries,	2017	(percentage	of	respondents)12	
	
	
Brexit	adds	another	 layer	of	uncertainty.	The	UK	 is	not	only	the	second	 largest	economy	in	the	EU	
and	a	net	contributor	to	the	EU	budget,	but	also	the	biggest	non-eurozone	member	state.	Brexit	may	
leave	the	remaining	non-eurozone	countries	marginalized.	The	UK	also	acted	as	an	ideological	ally	of	
																																								 																				
12	European	Commission	(2017):	Standard	Eurobarometer	87,	May.	Brussels:	EC.	
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the	 CEE	 countries,	 promoting	 the	 deepening	 of	 the	 internal	market	 and	 voicing	 scepticism	 about	
further	deeper	of	the	EU	integration.	The	UK	was	an	awkward	and	Eurosceptic	member	state,	but	its	
positions	 were	 acknowledged	 and	 respected.	 On	 several	 occasions,	 the	 UK	 provided	 a	 shield	 for	
other,	more	 reluctant	 or	 Eurosceptic	 EU	member	 states	 from	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe.	 In	 this	
sense,	Brexit	may	expose	the	Czech	Republic	as	an	 increasingly	Eurosceptic	member	state.	Being	a	
liberal	 Western	 democracy,	 the	 UK	 provided	 some	 “geopolitical	 balance”	 to	 the	 political	 debate	
about	the	future	of	the	EU.	With	the	UK	gone,	there	is	a	danger	that	the	most	Eurosceptic	countries	
will	all	be	in	the	“East”,	which	would	reinforce	the	East-West	divide.	
	
4.1.2.  Czech interests  on the EU-UK deal  
Economy.	The	United	Kingdom	is	an	 important	trading	partner	of	 the	Czech	Republic.	 In	2016,	 the	
UK	was	 the	 country’s	 fourth	most	 important	 export	 partner	 (after	Germany,	 Slovakia	 and	Poland)	
and	 exports	 of	 goods	 to	 the	 country	 represent	 5.2	 per	 cent	 of	 total	 exports	 (Table	 2).	 More	
importantly,	 since	 2001,	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 has	 had	 a	 noticeably	 positive	 trade	 balance	with	 the	
United	Kingdom	–	 imports	from	the	UK	reach	only	around	45	per	cent	of	Czech	Exports	to	the	UK.	
Czech	 exports	 to	 the	 UK	 are	 dominated	 by	 technologically	 advanced	 products	 (machinery	 and	
transport	equipment),	which	adds	to	the	 importance	of	the	British	market	for	the	Czech	economy.	
The	Czech	Republic	has	an	interest	in	maintaining	trade	relations	with	the	United	Kingdom	which	has	
been	reflected	in	numerous	public	declarations	by	Czech	politicians	and	in	interviews	with	officials.13	
	
Table	2.	Trade	in	goods	between	the	UK	and	the	V4,	201614	
	
Share	of	the	UK	
in	total	export	
of	goods	(%)	
UK's	rank	
among	export	
destinations	
Share	of	the	UK	in	
total	import	of	
goods	(%)	
UK's	rank	
among	import	
partners	
Imports	as	a	
percentage	of	
exports	
Czech	Rep.	 5.2	 4th	 2.7	 8th	 44.6	
Hungary	 3.9	 9th	 1.9	 14th	 43.9	
Poland	 6.6	 2nd	 2.6	 10th	 37.1	
Slovakia	 5.9	 5th	 1.8	 12th	 29.5	
	
More	recent	reports	however	indicate	a	slowdown	in	the	expansion	of	trade	relations	between	the	
Czech	Republic	and	the	UK.	According	to	the	analysis	by	the	Association	of	Small	and	Medium-Sized	
Enterprises	 and	 Crafts	 CZ,	 the	 growth	 of	 Czech	 exports	 to	 the	 UK	 has	 significantly	 slowed	 down.	
While	 in	2015	Czech	exports	 rose	by	12	per	 cent,	 the	growth	of	exports	 in	2016	stood	at	one	per	
cent	and	the	trend	continued	in	the	first	half	of	2017	with	an	anaemic	growth	of	one	per	cent	year-
on-year.15	The	 slowdown	 is	evident	 in	a	 comparative	perspective:	during	 the	 first	half	of	2017	 the	
overall	exports	of	the	Czech	Republic	grew	by	5.7	per	cent.	Exports	to	Germany	grew	by	seven	and	
																																								 																				
13	 Czech	 Government	 (2017):	 Vláda	 schválila	 pozici	 České	 republiky	 k	 vyjednávání	 o	 vystoupení	 Velké	 Británie	 z	 EU,	
https://www.vlada.cz/cz/media-centrum/aktualne/vlada-schvalila-pozici-ceske-republiky-k-vyjednavani-o-vystoupeni-
velke-britanie-z-eu--155204/.	
14	OECD	(2017a):	International	Trade	and	Balance	of	Payments	Statistics,	http://www.oecd.org/trade/its/.	
15	 ASMP	 (2017a):	 Obchod	 s	 Velkou	 Británií	 zpomaluje.	 Praha:	 Asociace	 malých	 a	 středních	 podniků	 a	 živnostníků	 ČR,	
http://amsp.cz/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/TZ-2017-10-03-Obchod-s-Velkou-Brit%C3%A1ni%C3%AD-zpomaluje.docx;	
ASMP	 (2017b):	 Analýza	 ASMP	 ČR.	 Obchodní	 a	 investiční	 aktivity	 mezi	 ČR	 a	 Velkou	 Británií.	 Praha:	 Asociace	 malých	 a	
středních	 podniků	 a	 živnostníků	 ČR,	 http://amsp.cz/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/TZ-2017-10-03-
p%C5%99%C3%ADloha_Anal%C3%BDza-obchodu-a-investic-%C4%8CR-V.Brit_.-10-2017.pdf.	
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to	 France	 by	 four	 per	 cent.	 The	 slowdown	 has	 been	 attributed	 to	 the	 “psychological	 effect	 of	
Brexit”.16	
Trade	 in	 services	 between	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 and	 the	 UK	 is	 less	 important	 than	 trade	 in	 goods.	
Czech	service	exports	 to	 the	UK	 in	2016	made	up	only	14	per	cent	of	 total	exports	 to	 the	UK.	The	
share	 of	 services	 in	 total	 imports	 is	 somewhat	 higher	 at	 33	 per	 cent.17	 Even	 though	 the	UK	 is	 an	
overall	net	exporter	of	services,	the	Czech	Republic	maintains	a	positive	balance	in	service	trade	with	
the	UK,	although	the	gap	between	exports	and	imports	is	not	as	large	as	in	case	of	goods	(see	Table	
3).	Most	 important	 components	are	 transport	 services	and	 tourism.	Trade	 in	 services	 could	be	hit	
significantly	by	a	clean/hard	Brexit,	however	it	is	far	less	important	for	the	Czech	Republic	than	trade	
in	goods.		
	
Table	3.	Trade	in	services	between	the	UK	and	the	V4,	201518	
	
Share	of	the	UK	
in	total	export	of	
services	(%)	
UK's	rank	
among	export	
destinations	
Share	of	the	UK	
in	total	import	
of	services	(%)	
UK's	rank	
among	import	
partners	
Imports	as	a	
percentage	of	
exports	
Czech	Rep.	 5.9	 3rd	 4.9	 5th	 72.7	
Hungary	 7.9	 3rd	 9.7	 3rd	 89.9	
Poland	 7.0	 3rd	 8.7	 2nd	 91.5	
Slovakia	 2.9	 12th	 2.8	 8th	 97.0	
Source:	OECD,	International	Trade	and	Balance	of	Payments	Statistics,	2017	
	
Flows	 of	 foreign	 direct	 investments	 are	 highly	 asymmetrical	 both	 in	 absolute	 and	 relative	 terms.	
While	the	historical	total	of	all	British	FDI	in	the	Czech	Republic	stands	at	115.6	billion	CZK,	Czech	FDI	
in	the	UK	is	only	7.5	billion	CZK.	In	relative	terms,	the	British	FDI	stock	in	the	Czech	Republic	makes	
up	about	4	per	cent	of	all	investments	in	the	country	(Figure	2),	while	Czech	investments	in	the	UK	
represent	 only	 1.3	 per	 cent	 of	 all	 FDI	 made	 by	 Czech	 subjects	 abroad.19	 One	 can	 argue	 that	 the	
asymmetry	is	caused	by	the	competitiveness	of	the	British	market.	Another	interpretation	is	that	the	
UK	is	simply	perceived	as	a	less	attractive	destination	for	Czech	capital	(in	contrast	to	countries	usch	
as	the	Netherlands,	Slovakia,	Cyprus,	Germany	or	Greece).20	The	data	also	suggests	that	the	UK	and	
British	offshore	centres	are	less	attractive	for	Czech	capital	then	other	low	tax	European	jurisdictions	
such	as	Cyprus	or	the	Netherlands.	
The	movement	of	Czech	workers	to	the	UK	has	been	the	lowest	among	the	V4	countries	(Figure	3).	
The	 Czech	 interests	 in	 the	 four	 freedoms	 are	 thus	 not	 balanced.	 Trade	 in	 goods	 dominates	 over	
trade	in	services,	investments	or	labour	movement.	Despite	the	slowdown	after	Brexit,	the	UK	is	still	
an	important	market	for	Czech	goods	with	a	positive	trade	balance.	On	the	other	side,	the	share	of	
trade	in	services	in	total	transactions	is	relatively	low,	especially	if	one	takes	into	account	that	the	UK	
is	a	service-oriented	economy.	FDI	from	the	UK	is	important	(the	UK	is	the	seventh	largest	investor	in	
the	Czech	Republic),	but	the	stakes	of	Czech	investors	in	the	UK	are	extremely	low	in	both	absolute	
and	 in	 relative	 terms.	 The	 salience	 of	 trade	 in	 goods	 is	 reflected	 in	 public	 declarations	 of	 Czech	
																																								 																				
16	ASMP	(2017a):	op.	cit.	
17	ASMP	(2017b):	op	.cit.	
18	OECD	(2017a):	op.	cit.	
19	ASMP	(2017b):	op.	cit.	
20	 Czech	 National	 Bank	 (2016):	 Foreign	 direct	 investment	 in	 2015.	 Czech	 National	 Bank,	
https://www.cnb.cz/miranda2/export/sites/www.cnb.cz/en/statistics/bop_stat/bop_publications/pzi_books/PZI_2015_EN
.pdf.	
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politicians	and	in	interviews	with	officials.21	In	his	reaction	to	the	invocation	of	Article	50	by	the	UK,	
Czech	Prime	Minister	Bohuslav	Sobotka	vowed	to	protect	Czech	exports	 to	 the	UK	and	Czech	 jobs	
tied	 to	 these	 exports,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 “rights	 of	 Czech	 expats”	 in	 Britain.22	 The	 free	movement	 of	
services	and	capital	has	received	far	less	attention	in	the	public	discourse.	
	
Figure	2.	Inward	stock	of	UK	FDI	as	a	share	of	total	FDI	stock	in	the	CEE	countries,	2007-201523	
	
	
Figure	3.	Stocks	of	V4	migrants	in	the	UK,	2010-2015	(percentage	of	sending	country	population)24	
	
	
Security.	The	Czech	Republic’s	security	depends	on	collective	defence	and	multilateral	mechanisms	
rather	 than	 bilateral	 security	 guarantees.25	 In	 the	 past,	 there	 were	 attempts	 by	 the	 centre-right	
government	to	establish	some	kind	of	bilateral	security	ties	with	the	USA	through	the	installation	of	
a	 radar	 base	 on	 the	 Czech	 soil.	 But	 in	 2008,	 this	 path	 of	 bilateral	 security	 arrangement	 has	 been	
																																								 																				
21	Interview	with	an	official	from	the	Czech	MFA,	European	Section,	6	December	2017.	
22	 Radio	 Prague	 (2017):	 PM	 Sobotka	 vows	 active	 Czech	 role	 in	 Brexit	 negotiations,	
http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/pm-sobotka-vows-active-czech-role-in-brexit-negotiations.	
23	OECD	(2017b):	FDI	flows	by	partner	country,	https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=FDI_FLOW_PARTNER.		
24	OECD	(2017c):	International	Migration	Database,	https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG.		
25	 Czech	 Government	 (2015a):	 Security	 Strategy	 of	 the	 Czech	 Republic,	
http://www.army.cz/images/id_8001_9000/8503/Security_Strategy_2015.pdf.		
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abandoned	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 more	 multilateral	 approach	 under	 the	 NATO	 framework.26	 Given	 the	
negative	 historical	 experience	 with	 bilateral	 security	 agreements	 with	 western	 European	 powers,	
there	is	little	appetite	to	build	bilateral	security	guarantees	with	the	UK	or	others.	
The	 security	 relationship	 between	 the	 UK	 and	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 is	 embedded	 in	 the	 wider	
multilateral	 framework	 of	NATO	 and	 EU	membership.27	 According	 to	 the	 Czech	Republic’s	 foreign	
policy	concept,	 the	country	“ascribes	an	 important	 role	 to	 the	United	Kingdom	especially	as	 far	as	
the	EU’s	Common	Foreign	and	Security	Policy	is	concerned.”28	It	is	therefore	fair	to	assume	that	after	
the	 withdrawal	 of	 the	 UK	 from	 EU’s	 Common	 Foreign	 and	 Security	 Policy	 (CFSP),	 the	 strategic	
importance	of	the	UK	will	decline,	even	though	it	remains	a	“prominent	actor”.	Therefore,	there	are	
no	incentives	to	negotiate	a	bilateral	security	agreement	with	the	UK	after	Brexit.	None	the	less,	the	
Czech	Republic	has	shown	interest	 in	bilateral	projects	to	strengthen	cooperation	with	the	UK.	For	
example,	 in	 2016,	 71	 such	 projects	 were	 announced	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 fostering	 cooperation	 on	
training	 and	 education,	 and	 improving	 the	 fighting	 readiness	 of	 the	 Czech	 armed	 forced.29	 Such	
forms	of	cooperation	may	remain	after	Brexit.	
Most	of	 the	day	 to	day	 security	and	military	 cooperation	between	 the	UK	and	 the	Czech	Republic	
however	takes	place	 in	the	framework	of	NATO.	Since	the	UK	has	no	 intentions	to	disengage	from	
NATO	 post-Brexit,	 it	 is	 not	 expected	 that	 practical	 military	 cooperation	 will	 suffer	 as	 a	 result	 of	
Brexit.	 Even	 though	 the	 British	 government	 believes	 that	 the	 UK’s	 role	 in	 security	 and	 military	
cooperation	gives	it	an	upper	hand	in	the	negotiations,	Czech	officials	do	not	seem	concerned	about	
the	possible	negative	impact	of	Brexit	on	security	cooperation.	
	
Institutional	aspects.	The	United	Kingdom	 is	widely	 recognized	as	not	only	an	 important	economic	
and	security	partner	for	the	Czech	Republic,	but	also	as	a	strategic	and	ideological	ally	within	the	EU.	
The	UK	was	a	key	supporter	of	the	EU’s	eastern	enlargement,	and	after	2004	the	Czech	Republic	and	
the	UK	 shared	 interests	 in	 several	 areas	 of	 EU	policy,	 especially	 in	 terms	of	 completing	 the	 single	
market	through	more	competition	and	greater	openness	to	services.30 Therefore,	Brexit	was	not	 in	
the	Czech	national	interests.	Most	Czech	politicians	reacted	to	the	results	of	the	Brexit	referendum	
correspondingly	–	the	general	mood	in	late	June	2016	was	that	of	“gloom	and	regret.”31	Since	Brexit	
was	perceived	as	“irreversible”	by	the	Czech	politicians,	the	government	seems	to	prefer	a	second-
best	institutional	model	for	the	future	EU-UK	relationship	which	would	be	as	close	as	possible	to	the	
current	status	quo:	the	EFTA/Norway	model,	with	the	UK	remaining	in	the	single	market.32	
Trade	 relations	 between	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 and	 the	 UK	 are	 asymmetrical	 in	 terms	 of	 relative	
importance	for	both	countries.	While	the	UK	 is	 the	Czech	Republic’s	 fourth	most	 important	export	
market,	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 is	 UK’s	 29th	 export	 market,	 representing	 just	 0.54	 per	 cent	 of	 British	
exports.33	 The	 two	 countries	 are	 locked	 in	 a	 relationship	 of	 asymmetrical	 interdependence,	which	
																																								 																				
26	 Schneider,	 J.	 (2014):	The	US-Czech	 Strategic	Relationship:	A	Roadmap	 for	 the	 Future	 in	 Security	 and	Defence.	 Prague:	
Centre	 for	 Transatlantic	 Relations,	 http://www.cevroinstitut.cz/upload/ck/files/PCTR/Publikace/Policy%20paper_	
Schneider.pdf.	
27	Kasáková,	Z.	(2016):	Great	Britain	in	the	Czech	Foreign	policy.	In:	Kořan,	M.l	(ed.):	Czech	Foreign	Policy	in	2015:	Analysis.	
Praha:	Ústav	mezinárodních	vztahů,	pp.	258-275.		
28	 Czech	 Government	 (2015b):	 Concept	 of	 the	 Czech	 Republic’s	 Foreign	 Policy,	
http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign_relations/policy_planning/concept_of_the_czech_republic_s_foreign.html.	
29	UK	Government	 (2016):	Czech	and	British	Armed	Forces	 tighten	 cooperation,	 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/	
czech-and-british-armed-forces-tighten-cooperation.	
30	Chromiec,	J.	J.	(2016):	Visegrad	Four	in	Brexit	negotiations:	Tale	of	two	tables.	Berlin:	Jacques	Delors	Institute.	
31	 Radio	 Prague	 (2016b):	 Czech	 politicians	 agree	 that	 EU	 needs	 to	 reform	 in	 wake	 of	 Brexit,	
http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/czech-politicians-agree-that-eu-needs-to-reform-in-wake-of-brexit.	
32	Interview	with	an	official	from	the	Czech	MFA,	European	Section,	4	January	2018.	
33	 BusinessInfo.cz	 (2017):	 Velká	 Británie:	 Obchodní	 a	 ekonomická	 spolupráce	 s	 ČR.	 CzechTrade,	
http://www.businessinfo.cz/cs/clanky/velka-britanie-obchodni-a-ekonomicka-spoluprace-s-19073.html.	
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has	important	implications	for	the	institutional	aspects	of	the	negotiations	between	the	EU	and	the	
UK	and	the	future	relationship.	The	fact	that	the	Czech	Republic	is	more	dependent	on	the	UK	than	
vice	 versa	means	 that	 in	 case	of	bilateral	negotiations,	 the	Czech	Republic	would	 find	 itself	 in	 the	
weaker	 position.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 country	 to	 negotiate	 through	 the	 EU.	 Even	
though	 trade	 in	 goods	with	 the	UK	 is	more	 important	 than	other	 types	of	 transactions,	 there	has	
been	 little	 desire	 in	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 to	 prioritize	 trade	 in	 goods	 and	 break	 with	 the	 EU27	
consensus	that	all	four	freedoms	are	inseparable.	According	to	Czech	officials,	the	Czech	Republic	is	
aware	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 any	 cherry-picking	 would	 quickly	 lead	 to	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 common	
negotiating	position.34	Seeing	a	benefit	of	strong	joint	EU	position,	the	Czech	Republic	refrained	from	
undertaking	separate	negotiations	with	the	UK.35	
	
4.1.3.  Czech interests  on Brexit- induced changes in  the UK 
The	Czech	Republic	has	 little	political	stakes	within	British	domestic	politics,	apart	 from	immediate	
concerns	 about	 the	 wellbeing	 of	 Czech	 citizens	 living	 in	 the	 country.	 For	 example,	 the	 Czech	
government	has	no	stakes	in	the	Northern	Ireland	peace	process,	it	has	no	territorial	disputes	with	
the	 UK	 like	 Spain.	 The	 Czech	 Republic	 has	 no	 separatist	 /	 autonomist	movements	 on	 its	 soil	 and	
therefore	 has	 no	 stakes	 in	 the	 future	 of	 Scottish	 independence	 struggles.	 Czech	 officials	
acknowledge,	 that	out	of	 the	 three	 issues	 that	were	discussed	during	 the	 first	phase	of	 the	Brexit	
negotiations,	the	Czech	Republic	had	the	least	interest	in	the	issue	of	the	Irish	border.36	
None	the	less,	given	that	the	UK	is	an	important	destination	for	Czech	exports,	it	is	in	the	interest	of	
the	Czech	Republic	 that	British	rules	and	product	standards	do	not	diverge	from	European	ones	 in	
the	 future.	 Significant	 divergence	 in	 rules	 would	 make	 market	 access	 more	 difficult	 for	 Czech	
exporters.	 In	 the	 early	 phases	 of	 the	 negotiations	 much	 attention	 was	 paid	 to	 the	 fate	 of	 Czech	
citizens	 living	 in	 the	EU.	However,	 this	attention	was	more	a	 result	of	 immediate	emotions	after	a	
surge	 of	 attacks	 against	 Czech	 and	 other	 Central	 Europeans	 in	 the	 UK,37	 rather	 than	 a	 cold	
calculation	of	national	interests.	After	the	end	of	the	first	phase	of	negotiations	however,	the	issue	
of	citizens'	rights	is	considered	settled,	and	it	receives	far	less	public	and	political	attention.38		
	
4.1.4.  Czech interests  on EU level  changes caused by Brexit  
The	first	tangible	impact	of	Brexit	on	the	EU	is	the	hole	it	will	leave	in	the	EU	budget,	as	the	UK	was	
the	 third	 largest	 net	 contributor.	 The	 Czech	 Republic	 is	 a	 net	 recipient	 of	 EU	 funds,	 and	 thus	 its	
interests	are	directly	 threatened	by	Brexit.	According	 to	 some	estimates	 the	Czech	Republic	 could	
lose	 up	 to	 €4.8	 billion	 due	 to	 Brexit.39	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 Czech	 government	 is	 aware	 of	 the	
challenge	 and	 insists	 that	 Brexit	 must	 not	 threaten	 EU	 funding	 during	 the	 current	 multiannual	
financial	framework	(2014-2020).40	On	the	other	hand,	Czech	political	elites	have	no	strategy	for	the	
post-2020	 period,	 and	 for	 the	 moment	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 will	 become	 a	 net	
contributor	to	the	EU	budget.	Brexit	only	hastens	the	arrival	of	this	economic	(and	political)	tipping	
																																								 																				
34	Interview	with	an	official	from	the	Czech	MFA,	European	Section,	4	January	2018.	
35	Brusenbauch	Meislová,	M.	(2017):	Shaped	by	pragmatism:	What	the	Czechs	want	to	get	out	of	Brexit.	London	School	of	
Economics,	European	Politics	and	Policy.	
36	Interview	with	an	official	from	the	Czech	MFA,	European	Section,	4	January	2018.	
37	The	Guardian	(2016):	Czech	PM	urges	Theresa	May	to	stop	attacks	on	citizens	after	Brexit	vote.	30	September.		
38	Interview	with	an	official	from	the	Czech	MFA,	European	Section,	4	January	2018.	
39	 ČT24	 (2017):	 Šlechtová	 pro	 ČT:	 Česko	 by	 po	 brexitu	 mohlo	 přijít	 na	 eurofondech	 o	 120	 miliard	 korun,	
http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/ekonomika/2163807-slechtova-pro-ct-cesko-po-brexitu-mohlo-prijit-na-eurofondech-o-
120-miliard-korun.		
40	 Euroskop.cz	 (2017):	 Sobotka:	 Brexit	 nesmí	 ovlivnit	 současné	 fondy	 EU,	 https://www.euroskop.cz/9002/	
28920/clanek/sobotka-brexit-nesmi-ovlivnit-soucasne-fondy-eu/.	
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point.	Czech	officials	admit	that	there	is	no	strategy	because	the	country	is	not	expected	to	become	
a	net	contributor	before	2023,	which	is	well	beyond	the	current	political	cycle.41	
The	Czech	officials	are	aware	of	the	possible	marginalization	of	non-eurozone	member	states	in	the	
post-Brexit	EU.42	After	the	UK’s	withdrawal,	the	eurozone	will	represent	85	per	cent	of	the	EU’s	GDP	
and	76	per	cent	of	 its	population,	and	could	easily	form	a	voting	bloc	within	the	Council,	based	on	
the	shared	interests	of	the	eurozone	member	countries.	It	is	in	the	interests	of	the	Czech	Republic	to	
prevent	 the	 emergence	 of	 such	 a	 consolidated	 voting	 bloc	 –	 the	 country	 would	 find	 itself	 in	 an	
extremely	weak	negotiating	position	if	 it	were	to	face	such	a	bloc.	Even	though	a	number	of	Czech	
politicians	challenge	the	idea	that	the	eurozone	represents	some	kind	of	coherent	“core”	of	the	EU,43	
officials	within	the	government	see	the	possible	marginalization	of	non-eurozone	member	states	as	
real	threat.	Institutional	changes	within	the	EU	and	further	formalization	of	the	eurozone	institutions	
would	also	weaken	 the	Czech	position	within	 the	EU.	 In	 the	aftermath	of	 the	economic	 crisis,	 the	
eurozone	already	 formalized	and	strengthened	 its	 institutions.44	The	eurozone	already	has	 its	own	
“primary	 law”	 in	 the	 form	 of	 intergovernmental	 treaties	 (the	 Fiscal	 Compact	 and	 the	 European	
Stability	Mechanism	treaty),	which	are	outside	of	the	EU’s	primary	law.45	The	impact	of	Brexit	on	the	
institutional	setup	of	the	eurozone	 is	difficult	 to	estimate.	On	the	one	hand,	Brexit	may	accelerate	
the	deepening	of	the	eurozone	and	the	strengthening	of	its	separate	institutions.	On	the	other	hand,	
with	the	UK	gone	and	the	voting	power	of	remaining	non-eurozone	member	states	diminished,	the	
eurozone	states	may	simply	use	existing	EU	institutions	for	promoting	the	its	interests.		
Some	deeper	integration	within	the	eurozone	can	be	supported	by	the	Czech	Republic,	especially	in	
terms	of	 stricter	 fiscal	 rules,	 however,	 greater	 risk	 sharing	mechanisms,	 such	 as	 eurobonds,	 seem	
unacceptable.	 Non-eurozone	 member	 states	 from	 the	 V4	 always	 took	 the	 threat	 of	 separate	
eurozone	 institutions	 seriously.	They	opposed	 the	establishment	of	EMU	summits,	 and	when	 they	
were	 formalized	 in	 the	 Fiscal	 Compact,	 Poland	 insisted	 that	 the	 participation	 of	 non-eurozone	
countries	was	guaranteed.46	Five	years	later,	when	the	EU	renewed	plans	for	strengthening	separate	
eurozone	 institutions	 (the	eurogroup),	 the	Czech	 government	proposed	an	observer	 seat	 for	 non-
eurozone	finance	ministers.47		
The	recent	push	by	the	Czech	government	 in	favour	of	deeper	defence	cooperation	within	the	EU,	
which	is	 largely	shared	by	the	new	government,48	 illustrates	that	the	EU	CFSP	plays	an	increasingly	
important	political	role	in	Czech	foreign	and	defence	policy.	Brexit	did	not	diminish	the	appetite	of	
the	Czech	governments	to	pursue	closer	security	cooperation	within	the	EU,	on	the	contrary,	Brexit	
is	mentioned	 as	 one	 of	 the	 pressing	 foreign	 policy	 issues	 and	 turbulences	 behind	 a	 push	 for	 the	
creation	of	a	joint	European	military	force.49	
																																								 																				
41	Interview	with	an	official	from	the	Czech	MFA,	European	Section,	4	January	2018.	
42	 Euractiv.cz	 (2017):	 Česko	 po	 brexitu:	 studie	 naznačuje	 tři	 možné	 scénáře,	 http://euractiv.cz/clanky/cr-v-evropske-
unii/cesko-po-brexitu-studie-naznacuje-tri-mozne-scenare/.	
43	Zahradil,	J.	(2017):	To,	zda	být,	či	nebýt	v	„tvrdém	jádru“	EU,	bude	klíčovým	střetem	volebního	období.	Parlamentní	listy,	
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44	The	eurogroup	was	formally	established	by	the	Lisbon	Treaty,	even	though	it	is	dependent	on	the	Council	for	its	decision-
making.	Separate	euro	summits	have	been	formalized	in	the	Fiscal	Compact.	
45	Beneš,	V.	and	Braun,	M.	(2014):	An	ever-closer	eurozone	and	its	consequences	for	differentiated	integration	in	Europe.	
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46	 Euinside	 (2012):	 The	 Polish	 Amendment	 in	 the	 New	 Fiscal	 Treaty,	 http://www.euinside.eu/en/news/the-polish-
amendment-in-the-new-fiscal-treaty.	
47	 Reuters	 (2017a):	 Czechs	 may	 seek	 observer	 seat	 at	 beefed-up	 euro	 group	 to	 keep	 information	 flow,	
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-czech-eu/czechs-may-seek-observer-seat-at-beefed-up-euro-group-to-keep-
information-flow-idUSKCN1B11LY?il=0.	
48	 Czech	 Government	 (2017):	 Návrh	 programového	 prohlášení	 vlády,	 https://www.vlada.cz/cz/jednani-vlady/navrh-
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49	 Radio	 Prague	 (2016a):	 Prime	 Minister	 Sobotka	 calls	 for	 creation	 of	 EU	 army	 to	 complement	 NATO,	
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The	 changes	 to	 the	 institutional	 structure	 of	 the	 EU	 and	 other	 far-reaching	 reforms	 promoted	 by	
some	European	politicians	would	require	the	re-opening	the	EU	treaties.	Virtually	all	Czech	officials	
and	 most	 politicians	 are	 vehemently	 opposed	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 re-negotiating	 EU	 treaties.50	 Czech	
officials	are	aware	of	the	tortuous	ratification	process	of	the	Lisbon	Treaty,	and	treaty	change	would	
be	difficult	to	sell	to	the	Eurosceptic	Czech	public.	A	call	by	Eurosceptic	and	populist	political	parties	
for	 a	 ratification	 of	 any	 changes	 by	 referendum	would	 be	 difficult	 to	 resist.	 Times	 have	 however	
changed	since	the	ratification	of	 the	Lisbon	treaty.	While	 in	2009	the	rest	of	 the	EU	was	willing	to	
provide	 additional	 reassurances	 to	 the	 Czech	 Republic,	 today	 any	 threat	 of	 a	 veto	 by	 the	 Czech	
electorate,	or	any	other	non-eurozone	country,	would	prompt	the	eurozone	to	go	its	own	way,	as	it	
did	in	reaction	to	the	UK’s	veto	of	the	Fiscal	Compact	in	December	2011.		
	
4.1.5.  Summary of  Czech interests  
The	Czech	interests	can	be	summarized	as	follows:	
• The	Czech	Republic	is	an	increasingly	Eurosceptic	country,	which	is	likely	to	be	compounded	
in	 the	medium	 term	by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 country	will	 become	a	net	 contributor	 to	 the	EU	
budget.	
• Ensuring	 access	 to	 the	UK	market	 is	 important	 for	 the	 Czech	Republic,	mainly	 in	 terms	 of	
goods,	but	also,	to	a	lesser	degree,	in	terms	of	services.	It	is	a	key	Czech	interest	that	the	UK	
remains	aligned	with	EU	rules	and	product	standards	
• The	issue	of	citizens	living	in	the	UK	has	not	been	such	an	important	issue	as	in	the	other	V4	
countries,	and	it	is	now	seen	as	settled	by	the	Czech	government.	
• Not	all	of	the	four	freedoms	are	equally	important	for	the	Czech	Republic	in	relation	to	the	
UK,	 but	 it	 accepts	 the	 EU	 consensus	 that	 they	 are	 inseparable	 in	 the	 single	 market.	 The	
Czech	 Republic	 has	 a	 strong	 interest	 in	 negotiating	 only	 through	 the	 EU,	 and	 has	 been	
satisfied	with	how	this	was	conducted	during	the	first	phase.	
• Brexit	 weakens	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 in	 the	 EU’s	 decision	 making	 procedures.	 A	 key	 Czech	
interest	in	the	longer	term	is	to	avoid	the	marginalization	of	non-eurozone	member	states.	
Treaty	change	is	not	supported	by	the	Czech	Republic,	but	it	does	support	some	aspects	of	
closer	integration,	such	as	deeper	defence	cooperation.	
	
4.2. Hungary 
4.2.1.  Hungary and the EU 
The	EU	plays	a	vital	role	for	Hungary,	which	is	observable	in	many	areas.	However,	two	in	particular	
stand	out.	First,	Hungary’s	economy	is	very	closely	integrated	in	trade	terms	with	other	EU	member	
states,	which	is	exemplified	by	the	fact	that	approximately	80	per	cent	of	Hungarian	trade	is	directed	
towards	EU	members.51	Germany	is	by	far	the	most	 important	partner	for	Hungary,	accounting	for	
27.5	per	cent	of	exports	and	26	per	cent	of	imports	in	2016.52	Second,	Hungary	receives	significant	
funding	 from	 the	 EU	 through	 the	 Structural	 and	Cohesion	 Funds.	 According	 to	 a	 recent	 report	 by	
KPMG,53	during	the	EU	funding	cycle	between	2007	and	2013,	Hungarian	GDP	increased	by	4.6	per	
cent	in	total,	whereas	without	funds	from	the	EU,	it	probably	would	have	contracted	by	1.8	percent.	
																																								 																				
50	Interview	with	an	official	from	the	Czech	MFA,	European	Section,	4	January	2018.	
51	 International	 Trade	 Center	 (2017):	 International	 trade	 in	 goods,	 statistics	 by	 country,	
http://www.intracen.org/itc/market-info-tools/statistics-import-country-product-monthly/.	
52	OECD	(2017a):	op	cit.	
53	 KPMG	 (2017):	 A	 magyarországi	 európai	 uniós	 források	 felhasználásának	 és	 hatásainak	 elemzése	 a	 2007-2013-as	
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Hungary	was	also	 the	 largest	per	capita	beneficiary	of	 the	Structural	and	Cohesion	Funds	by	 far	 in	
comparison	to	other	V4	countries:	it	received	on	average	€437	per	capita	each	year	through	various	
EU	funds	between	2007	and	2015,	while	the	similar	data	for	the	Czech	Republic,	Slovakia	and	Poland	
are	€363,	€350	and	€332	respectively.	Ensuring	continued	access	to	this	funding	is	a	key	interest	for	
Hungary,	 otherwise	 it	 would	 need	 to	 initiate	 painful	 structural	 reforms	 to	 regain	 the	 competitive	
edge	which	the	country	had	lost	in	the	past	decade.54		
The	 current	 Hungarian	 government,	 led	 by	 Prime	 Minister	 Viktor	 Orbán,	 has	 an	 ambiguous	
relationship	with	the	EU.	On	the	one	hand	the	EU	is	frequently	criticized,	mostly	for	endangering	and	
decreasing	national	sovereignty.	The	Hungarian	government	has	even	launched	a	billboard	campaign	
in	2017	to	 ‘Stop	Brussels’,55	which	further	deteriorated	relations	between	the	EU	and	Hungary.	On	
the	 other	 hand,	 Hungary	 is	 very	much	 dependant	 on	 the	 EU	 both	 as	 a	 trading	 partner	 and	 as	 a	
source	of	funding,	as	discussed	above.	While	the	Hungarian	government	frequently	criticizes	the	EU,	
the	population	is	relatively	supportive	(Figure	1).	Despite	government	rhetoric,	there	is	no	intention	
to	leave	the	EU.	
A	 major	 challenge	 for	 Hungarian	 decision	 makers	 when	 trying	 to	 relate	 to	 Brexit	 was	 that	 the	
situation	had	been	constantly	changing	and	was	very	difficult	to	predict.56	Due	to	this	fluidity,	there	
was	no	 clear	Hungarian	position	on	many	of	 the	 related	 issues,	 and	Hungary	 simply	 accepted	 the	
common	 EU	 position.	 In	 a	 way,	 Hungary	 could	 be	 characterized	 as	 “reacting	 to”	 circumstances,	
rather	 than	 “creating”	 and	 influencing	 policy	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Brexit.	 All	 officials	 interviewed	 have	
argued	 that	 before	 the	 negotiation	 process	 began,	 all	 EU	 states	 had	 unanimously	 agreed	 on	 the	
priorities,	negotiation	points,	and	process	of	the	Brexit	talks.	This	kind	of	unity	was	unprecedented,	
according	 to	 one	 respondent,	 and	 drew	 the	 remaining	 27	 EU	 member	 states	 closer	 together.	
Hungary	was	not	looking	to	break	this	unity.	Despite	its	anti-EU	rhetoric,	the	government	seems	to	
have	valued	the	unified	EU	front	and	did	not	press	to	make	its	individual	voice	heard.	
	
4.2.2.  Hungarian interests  on the EU-UK deal  
Economy.	 All	 respondents	 agreed	 that	 the	 economic	 aspects	 of	 Brexit	 are	 of	 major	 interest	 to	
Hungary.	As	 visible	 from	Table	2,	 the	UK	was	 the	ninth	 largest	 goods	export	partner	 for	Hungary,	
with	 almost	 4	 per	 cent	 of	 Hungary’s	 exports	 going	 to	 Britain.	 The	 UK	 was	 Hungary’s	 fourteenth	
largest	 import	partner	 in	2016.	As	with	the	other	V4	countries,	Hungary	has	a	strong	surplus	 in	 its	
goods	trade	with	Britain.	Once	Brexit	occurs	it	is	expected	that	the	UK	will	become	the	largest	non-
EU	trading	partner	of	Hungary.	While	Hungary’s	trade	ties	with	the	UK	are	the	weakest	among	the	
V4	 countries,	 they	 are	 also	 rather	 vulnerable	 due	 to	 their	 concentration:	 as	 pointed	 out	 by	 an	
interviewee,	 approximately	 two	 thirds	 of	 the	 total	 value	 of	 goods	 trade	 between	 the	 UK	 and	
Hungary	 is	provided	by	about	70	products,	 including	cars,	car	engines	and	flat	screen	televisions.57	
Some	 expect	 the	 UK	 to	 introduce	 the	 EU	 tariff	 rate	 on	 these	 products	 after	 Brexit,	 which	 could	
seriously	harm	the	competitiveness	of	the	Hungarian	export	sector.		
The	value	of	trade	in	services	between	the	UK	and	Hungary	is	about	half	that	of	trade	in	goods,	but	
the	UK	is	a	much	more	important	partner	here	for	Hungary	than	it	is	in	case	of	goods:	it	is	the	third	
largest	destination	for	services	exports,	with	a	close	to	8	per	cent	share	of	Hungary’s	service	exports,	
the	highest	among	the	V4	countries	(Table	3).	The	balance	of	trade	in	services	shows	a	slight	surplus	
for	Hungary.	Beyond	tourism,	business	services	are	highly	 important	Hungarian	exports	 to	 the	UK,	
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57	International	Trade	Center	(2017):	op	cit.		
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and	thus	the	uncertainties	of	how	trade	in	services	will	be	regulated	after	Brexit	are	a	big	concern	for	
the	Hungarian	economy.	
The	UK	had	the	eighth	position	in	terms	of	FDI	stock	in	Hungary	in	2015,58	which	shows	that	British	
firms	have	a	rich	history	in	Hungary.	They	employ	approximately	73	000	people	in	almost	3	000	firms	
according	 to	 one	 respondent.59	 In	 September	 2016,	 a	 Hungarian-British	 Business	 Council	 was	
established	at	the	Hungarian	Embassy	 in	London60	to	make	sure	that	the	relationship	between	the	
UK	and	Hungary	is	not	harmed	by	Brexit.	British	firms	are	still	weighing	the	decision	on	whether	to	
move	new	capacities	to	Hungary	or	the	CEE	region	in	general.	They	see	no	rush	in	this	respect,	as	the	
EU	is	not	planning	on	creating	new	barriers	to	incoming	FDI	from	third	countries.61	As	with	the	other	
V4	 countries,	 FDI	 relations	 are	 highly	 asymmetrical,	 and	 the	 Hungarian	 FDI	 stock	 in	 the	 UK	 is	
minimal,	even	though	Hungary	is	the	most	significant	outward	investor	from	the	region.	
Among	the	economic	questions,	 freedom	of	movement	and	citizen’s	rights	have	been	perhaps	the	
most	important	issue	for	Hungary,	and	officials	have	followed	developments	on	this	topic	closely	in	
the	first	phase	of	the	negotiations.	The	importance	of	the	question	has	been	pointed	out	by	Prime	
Minister	 Orbán	 to	 Prime	Minister	May	 in	 November	 2016.62	 Official	 statistics	 put	 the	 number	 of	
Hungarians	 living	 in	 the	 UK	 around	 100	 thousand,	 but	 most	 experts	 agree	 that	 this	 is	 a	 highly	
conservative	estimates,	and	the	real	number	is	closer	to	250-300	thousands.63	Ensuring	the	rights	of	
these	people	after	Brexit	has	been	a	key	concern	during	the	first	phase	of	negotiations.	According	to	
an	 interviewed	official,	 the	government	now	believes	that	 rights	which	Hungarian	citizens	enjoy	 in	
the	UK	will	not	be	lost	after	Brexit.64		
The	 issue	of	 the	size	of	 the	 financial	settlement	has	also	been	settled	between	the	UK	and	the	EU	
during	 the	 first	 phase	 of	 negotiations,	 which	 came	 as	 a	 relief	 to	 Hungarian	 decision	 makers.	
Interviewed	officials	argued	that	it	was	quite	easy	to	find	consensus	among	old	and	new	EU	member	
states	about	 the	 importance	of	 the	 financial	 settlement	bill,	 since	without	 the	UK	paying	 its	dues,	
two	 scenarios	 could	 have	 occurred:	 either	 the	 CEE	 member	 states	 would	 have	 had	 to	 agree	 to	
receiving	a	lower	amount	of	EU	funds,	or	alternatively	the	net	contributor	EU	member	states	would	
have	needed	to	compensate	for	the	shortfall	of	funds.	Thus	far,	Hungarian	officials	have	placed	little	
attention	on	how	Brexit	will	impact	the	EU’s	budget	in	the	financial	framework	after.	
Based	on	the	above,	Hungary	clearly	prefers	that	the	UK	stays	 in	the	single	market	after	Brexit,	as	
that	would	ensure	continued	market	access	for	goods	and	services	exporters,	and	is	seen	as	the	best	
way	to	guarantee	the	rights	of	citizens.	However,	the	European	Council	clearly	stated	that	no	cherry	
picking	is	possible:	the	four	freedoms	are	inseparable	and	continued	free	movement	is	a	red	line	for	
the	British	government.	Without	single	market	membership,	it	is	in	the	interest	of	Hungary	that	the	
EU	negotiates	 a	 comprehensive	 free	 trade	agreement	 (FTA)	with	 the	UK	as	 soon	as	possible	 after	
Brexit.		
Security.	 As	 with	 the	 other	 V4	 countries,	 Hungary	 also	 sees	 its	 security	 closely	 tied	 to	 the	 Euro-
Atlantic	alliance.	One	respondent	indicated	that	it	would	be	in	the	interest	of	both	Hungary	and	the	
EU	for	the	UK	to	remain	a	part	of	the	security	system	in	Europe,	and	the	intelligence	sharing	aspect	
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of	clandestine	services	should	continue.65	Another	respondent	indicated	that	this	is	both	a	challenge	
and	 an	 opportunity	 for	 the	 EU:	 it	 can	 now	 put	 a	 larger	 emphasis	 on	 building	 up	 its	 own	military	
capabilities,	 which	 the	 UK	 had	 opposed	 previously.66	 The	 Hungarian	 position	 is	 to	 maintain	 all	
existing	 security	 arrangements,	 but	 not	 to	 duplicate	 NATO.	 Greater	 EU	 cooperation	 in	 defence	 is	
supported	 by	 Hungary,67	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 it	 is	making	 efforts	 to	meet	 the	 requirement	 of	
spending	2	per	cent	of	GDP	on	the	military	by	2024/2025.	Military	spending	for	2018	already	shows	
sizable	 increases	 compared	 to	 2015.68	 This	 means	 that	 Hungary	 is	 trying	 to	 improve	 its	 military	
capabilities	 to	meet	 NATO	 requirements	 and	 possibly	 to	 counter	 the	 negative	 effects	 of	 the	UK’s	
military	no	longer	taking	part	in	EU	missions.		
Institutional	aspects.	Issues	related	to	institutional	aspects	of	the	Brexit	deal	did	not	seem	to	figure	
prominently	among	the	issues	Hungarian	decision	makers	were	concerned	about.	Several	potential	
issues	 have	 been	 discussed	 during	 the	 interviews	 which	 the	 respondents	 believed	 that	 Hungary	
would	 favour:	 1)	 an	 interim	 Brexit	 deal	 or	 some	 sort	 of	 transition	 arrangements	 for	 the	 years	
following	March	2019;	2)	the	UK	eventually	joining	the	EEA;	3)	some	form	of	agreement	which	would	
deal	with	some	of	the	most	pressing	 issues	 in	mutual	relations	beyond	trade,	such	as	taxation	and	
investment.	Unfortunately,	positions	on	these	seemed	to	be	vague.	
	
4.2.3.  Hungarian interests  on Brexit- induced changes in  the UK 
In	 terms	 of	 the	 Brexit	 induced	 changes	 in	 the	 UK,	 the	 most	 important	 issue	 for	 the	 Hungarian	
government,	which	seems	to	have	been	settled	in	the	first	phase	of	the	negotiations,	is	the	rights	of	
Hungarians	(and	other	EU	nationals)	living	in	the	UK.	The	Hungarian	government	has	not	voiced	any	
strong	preferences	on	the	 immigration	regime	of	the	UK	towards	EU	nationals	who	would	want	to	
move	after	Brexit,	and	accepts	that	this	is	a	decision	for	the	UK	to	make.	
One	 respondent	 mentioned	 that	 there	 are	 many	 potential	 pitfalls	 in	 legal	 harmonization	 (or	 de-
harmonization	in	this	case),	as	once	British	law	starts	to	diverge	from	the	EU’s	regulations,	standards	
for	instance	in	tariff	nomenclature	or	in	healthcare	and	medical	regulation	will	make	it	challenging	to	
cooperate	with	the	UK,	and	access	the	British	market.69	Other	types	of	Brexit	induced	changes	in	the	
UK	 have	 not	 yet	 been	 discussed	 in	 Hungary	 (such	 as	 the	 impacts	 of	 Britain’s	 diminishing	 global	
position),	although	one	respondent	believes	that	 if	 there	 is	one	country	which	may	keep	 its	global	
position	 after	 such	 a	 major	 change	 in	 its	 orientation,	 it	 will	 be	 the	 UK.	 There	 were	 no	 strong	
preferences	 voiced	 either	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Northern	 Ireland,	 nor	 greater	 devolution	 to,	 or	 the	
independence	 of	 Scotland.	 However,	 given	 the	 numbers	 of	 ethnic	 Hungarian	 in	many	 of	 the	 CEE	
countries	and	their	struggles	to	ensure	their	cultural	rights,	Hungarian	governments	have	generally	
been	sympathetic	towards	ethnic	autonomy.	
	
4.2.4.  Hungarian interests  on EU level  changes caused by Brexit  
Once	 the	 UK	 leaves	 the	 EU,	 there	 are	 diverging	 opinions	 for	 the	 future	 of	 Europe	 and	 these	
discussions	on	the	future	mainly	centre	around	the	issue	of	the	institutional	structure	of	the	EU.	Two	
respondents	 have	 confirmed	 that	 Hungary	 does	 not	 believe	 that	 the	 EU	 is	 ready	 yet	 for	 the	
integration	 to	 deepen	 any	 further.70	 They	 believe	 that	 the	 first	 task	 of	 the	 EU	 should	 be	 to	 solve	
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current	 pressing	 problems	 before	 deeper	 integration	 could	 be	 discussed.	 According	 to	 Prime	
Minister	Orbán,71	Hungary	 is	 against	 any	 formalized	 “two	 speed	 Europe”,	 however	 it	 understands	
the	 reality	 that	 multispeed	 Europe	 may	 take	 place	 if	 some	 member	 states	 voluntarily	 decide	 to	
deepen	 cooperation	 amongst	 themselves.	An	example	 for	 increased	 cooperation	 is	 among	 the	V4	
countries,	who	have	 started	 to	harmonise	 financial	planning	and	 their	position	on	 cohesion	policy	
according	to	one	respondent.72	Poland’s	lead	in	the	Visegrad	cooperation	is	unquestioned,	as	Poland	
has	 the	 largest	 population	 and	 economic	 power	 in	 the	 CEE	 region.	 It	 was	 also	 indicated	 that	 the	
Hungarian	interest	is	to	increase	the	influence	of	member	states	and	the	Council,	at	the	expense	of	
the	Commission.		
A	further	negative	effect	of	Brexit	for	Hungary	is	that	the	position	of	non-eurozone	member	states	
within	EU	decision	making	might	weaken	further.	As	long	as	the	UK	was	a	part	of	the	EU,	it	was	able	
to	block	issues	which	may	have	impacted	on	non-eurozone	states	negatively.	However,	once	the	UK	
leaves,	 it	will	be	difficult	 to	put	 together	a	blocking	minority,	which	requires	at	 least	 four	member	
states	representing	at	least	35	per	cent	of	the	EU’s	population.	The	changed	power	dynamics	in	the	
EU	 are	 clearly	 seen	 as	 something	 Hungary	will	 need	 to	 adapt	 to,	 but	 so	 far	 there	 has	 been	 little	
discourse	on	it.	
	
4.2.5.  Summary of  Hungarian interests  
The	Hungarian	interests	can	be	summarized	as	follows:	
• Despite	rhetoric	from	Viktor	Orbán’s	Eurosceptic	government,	Hungary	is	closely	integrated	
into	the	EU	and	has	strong	reasons	to	remain	a	member.	Public	support	for	the	EU	is	high.	
• There	 has	 been	 no	 clear	 Hungarian	 position	 on	 a	 number	 of	 issues	 related	 to	 Brexit,	 and	
Hungary	supported	the	common	EU	position	in	these	cases.	The	government	seems	to	have	
valued	the	unity	of	the	EU.		
• Ensuring	 access	 to	 the	 UK	market	 is	 important	 for	 Hungary,	 both	 for	 goods	 and	 services.	
Hungary	has	a	stronger	interest	than	the	other	V4	in	maintaining	free	trade	in	services	with	
the	UK	 after	 Brexit.	 Ensuring	 that	 regulations	 and	 standards	 do	 not	 diverge	 after	 Brexit	 is	
also	seen	as	important.	Hungary	sees	keeping	the	UK	in	the	single	market	as	the	best	way	for	
ensuring	 this,	 but	 so	 far	 it	 has	 agree	 to	 the	 common	 EU	 position	 that	 the	 four	 freedoms	
cannot	be	separated.	
• During	the	first	phase	of	the	negotiations,	the	rights	of	Hungarian	citizens	to	stay	in	the	UK,	
and	 ensuring	 that	 the	 UK	meets	 its	 commitments	 under	 the	 current	 financial	 framework	
have	been	the	most	crucial	Hungarian	interests,	but	both	issues	are	now	seen	as	settled.		
• Hungary	does	not	support	further	deepening	of	the	EU	post-Brexit,	and	has	expressed	strong	
reservations	about	multispeed	Europe.	As	a	non-eurozone	country,	Hungary	sees	Brexit	as	
weakening	 its	own	position	within	the	EU,	and	 is	now	looking	to	build	coalitions	to	ensure	
that	 non-eurozone	 members	 are	 not	 affected	 adversely	 by	 decisions	 pushed	 through	 by	
members.	
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4.3. Poland 
4.3.1.  Poland and the EU 
Poland	 is	 the	 largest	 member	 state	 among	 the	 CEE	 countries,	 and	 has	 generally	 been	 seen	 as	 a	
success	story	of	EU	integration:	its	GDP	per	capita	increased	from	49	per	cent	of	the	EU	average	in	
2004	to	69	per	cent	in	2016.73	Poland	was	the	only	CEE	country	to	not	experience	a	recession	during	
the	economic	turmoil	which	followed	the	2008	global	financial	crisis.	Market	friendly	reforms,	strong	
internal	demand,	as	well	as	an	inflow	of	EU	funds	have	been	among	the	drivers	of	Polish	growth.	As	
the	other	V4	countries,	Poland	is	also	strongly	integrated	into	the	EU,	and	close	to	80	percent	of	its	
trade	is	with	other	member	states,	among	which	Germany	alone	accounts	for	35	percent.74	Due	to	
its	large	internal	market	however,	Poland	is	a	much	less	open	country	in	trade	terms	than	its	smaller	
V4	peers.	The	attitudes	of	Poles	towards	the	EU	is	the	most	positive	among	the	V4:	only	11	per	cent	
of	the	Polish	population	has	a	negative	view	about	the	EU	(see	Figure	1),	although	the	share	of	the	
population	which	trusts	the	EU	has	been	declining	since	2011.	
However,	 relationships	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 Poland	 have	 deteriorated	 in	 recent	 years.	 The	
government	of	the	right-wing	Law	and	Justice	(PiS)	party,	which	came	to	power	in	2015,	has	enacted	
a	number	of	highly	controversial	changes	and	reforms.	Most	importantly,	the	reform	of	the	judicial	
system,	which	allowed	much	stronger	political	control	over	the	judiciary,	has	been	seen	by	critics	of	
the	government	as	an	attack	on	the	rule	of	law	in	the	country.75	The	European	Commission	has	been	
especially	critical	of	the	Polish	government’s	actions,	as	have	a	number	of	high	profile	members	of	
the	European	Parliament.	In	December	2017	the	European	Commission	enacted	proceedings	against	
Poland	under	Article	7	of	the	Treaty	on	European	Union,	citing	“a	risk	of	serious	breach	of	the	rule	of	
law”.	Article	7	can	be	used	against	a	member	state	where	the	“respect	for	human	dignity,	freedom,	
democracy,	 equality,	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 and	 respect	 for	 human	 rights”	 is	 under	 threat,	 and	 can	
ultimately	lead	to	the	suspension	of	the	country’s	voting	rights	in	the	Council.	While	it	is	unlikely	to	
come	to	this,	the	enacting	of	Article	7	shows	how	badly	the	relationship	between	the	EU	and	Poland	
has	deteriorated.	
Poland	has	had	strong	bilateral	relations	with	the	UK,	especially	in	trade	terms.	However,	the	UK	has	
also	 been	 an	 ally	 for	 Poland	within	 the	 EU,	 and	 views	many	 issues	 in	 a	 similar	 light,	 including	 EU	
enlargement,	 a	hard-line	 stance	 towards	Russia,	 and	 the	 further	deepening	of	 the	 integration.76	A	
significant	 number	 of	 Poles	 have	 immigrated	 to	 the	 UK,	 and	 there	 is	 now	 a	 Polish	 community	 of	
around	a	million	people	living	in	Britain.	The	strength	of	these	bilateral	ties	was	shown	in	May	2017	
with	the	visit	of	PiS	party	leader	Jarosław	Kaczyński	to	the	UK,	and	more	recently	in	December	2017,	
when	 Theresa	May	 visited	Warsaw.	 The	 two	 countries	 not	 only	 reaffirmed	 their	 commitment	 to	
maintaining	a	close	relationship	after	Brexit,	but	also	signed	a	joint	defence	treaty	covering	training,	
military	 exercises,	 information	 sharing,	 and	 defence	 industry	 cooperation.	 The	 only	 other	 country	
with	which	 the	UK	has	 a	 similar	 treaty	 is	 France.77	 The	 Polish	 government	 has	 clearly	 affirmed	 its	
commitment	to	ensuring	that	the	UK	has	a	transparent,	fast	and	unprecedented	mode	of	agreement	
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with	 the	EU,	which	 includes	a	 transition	period	and	maintains	 cooperation	at	 the	highest	possible	
level.78	
	
4.3.2.  Pol ish interests  on the EU-UK deal  
Economy.	Poland	has	very	strong	economic	 ties	on	a	number	of	 fronts	with	 the	UK.	The	UK	 is	 the	
second	 largest	export	partner	 for	the	country	after	Germany,	accounting	for	6.6	per	cent	of	Polish	
goods	exports,	the	highest	share	among	the	V4	(Table	2).	Like	the	other	V4	countries,	Poland	has	a	
highly	positive	trade	balance	with	the	UK,	with	the	value	of	imports	from	Britain	only	reaching	37	per	
cent	 of	 the	 value	 of	 exports.	 Trade	 has	 expanded	 significantly	 between	 the	 two	 countries	 after	
Poland’s	 accession	 to	 the	 EU:	 Polish	 exports	 have	 more	 than	 tripled,	 and	 imports	 from	 the	 UK	
doubled	between	2005	and	2015.79	However,	the	expansion	of	trade	between	the	two	countries	has	
not	 only	 slowed	 down	 after	 2015,	 but	 in	 fact	 the	 value	 of	 total	 trade	 has	 contracted.	While	 this	
mirrors	certain	trends	in	Poland’s	trade	in	general,	it	is	also	specific	to	the	case	of	the	UK,	and,	as	in	
the	Czech	case,	can	be	seen	as	a	psychological	effect	of	the	Brexit	vote,	especially	given	how	Polish	
exports	to	Germany	increased	in	2016.		
The	UK	 is	 also	 an	 important	 destination	 for	 Polish	 service	 exports,	 although	 the	 value	 of	 trade	 in	
services	was	only	24	per	cent	of	the	value	of	goods	trade	in	2015.	Nonetheless,	the	UK	is	the	third	
largest	 export	market	 for	 Polish	 services,	with	 a	 7	 per	 cent	 share	 (Table	 3).	 The	UK	 is	 the	 second	
most	 important	 services	 importer,	 but	 Poland	 has	 a	 slight	 surplus	 in	 services	 trade	 with	 the	 UK.	
Trade	 in	 services	 with	 the	 UK	 is	 not	 as	 important	 for	 Poland	 as	 it	 is	 for	 Hungary,	 but	 there	 are	
concerns	about	potential	disruptions	which	a	hard	Brexit	could	cause.	
While	 in	 a	 relative,	 per	 capita	 sense,	 Poland	 was	 never	 among	 the	 CEE	 frontrunners	 in	 terms	 of	
attracting	FDI,	the	UK	is	a	much	more	important	source	of	capital	for	the	country	than	it	 is	for	the	
other	V4.	Around	4-5	percent	of	Poland’s	FDI	stock	originates	from	the	UK	(see	Figure	2).	The	UK	is	
fourth	 largest	 investor	 in	 Poland	 after	Germany,	 France,	 and	 the	USA.80	A	number	of	 large	British	
companies	 have	 invested	 in	 Poland,	mainly	 with	 the	 goal	 of	 gaining	 access	 to	 the	 Polish	market,	
although	some	experts	argue	that	UK	based	companies	have	been	punching	below	their	weight,	and	
significant	scope	remains	for	further	investments,	especially	in	the	manufacturing	sector.81	In	terms	
of	outward	FDI	from	Poland,	the	UK	seems	to	play	a	slightly	more	important	role	than	it	does	for	the	
other	V4	countries,	but	it	would	be	difficult	to	argue	that	Polish	FDI	in	Britain	is	significant.	
The	Polish	are	the	largest	ethnic	group	from	the	EU	states	in	the	UK.	Based	on	data	from	the	OECD,	
around	2.5	per	 cent	of	Poland’s	population	 lived	 in	 the	UK	 in	2015,	equalling	more	 than	1	million	
people.	Poland	thus	has	the	largest	share	of	 its	population	living	in	the	UK	among	the	V4.	The	fact	
that	Britain	opened	its	 labour	market	to	CEE	newcomers	in	2004	provided	significant	opportunities	
for	 Polish	 workers,	 who	 have	 now	 developed	 strong	 community	 structures	 in	 the	 country.82	 This	
community	is	a	highly	important	source	of	remittances	for	Poland,	with	transfers	reaching	around	€1	
billion	in	2016.83	Protecting	the	rights	of	this	community	 is	crucial	for	Poland,	and	given	the	size	of	
the	 community,	 it	 is	 perhaps	 an	 issue	 which	 Poland	 prioritizes	 even	 more	 than	 the	 other	 V4	
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countries.84	 As	 stated	 by	 Konrad	 Szymański,	 Poland’s	Minister	 for	 European	 Affairs,	 in	 September	
2017:		
Over	one	million	of	our	citizens	live	in	the	UK,	and	they	contribute	to	the	economic	development	
of	 this	 country	 through	 their	work	 and	 taxes.	We	 do	 not	want	 Brexit	 to	 adversely	 affect	 their	
situation	and	life	plans.	That	is	why	we	care	about	comprehensive	protection	including	access	to	
the	 labour	market,	 public	 services,	 social	 security.	 This	protection	 should	also	extend	 to	 family	
members	of	our	citizens.	We	believe	that	the	Union’s	position	meets	these	priorities.85	
However,	 Prime	 Minister	 Mateusz	 Morawiecki,	 in	 a	 joint	 press	 conference	 with	 Theresa	 May	 in	
December	2017,	argued	that	Poland	also	has	strong	interests	in	seeing	these	citizens	return	home.	86		
As	the	other	V4,	Poland	is	also	a	net	recipient	of	EU	funding,	and	has	been	clear	that	the	UK	needs	to	
meet	 the	 financial	obligations	 it	had	agreed	 to	under	 the	EU’s	current	multiannual	 framework.	EU	
Affairs	Minister	Szymański	argued	that	the	UK’s	commitments	“are	based	on	objective	premises	and	
have	a	solid	legal	basis.”87	This	issue,	as	well	as	the	issue	of	citizen’s	rights,	have	been	settled	during	
the	first	phase	of	negotiations	to	Poland’s	satisfaction.	
Poland	clearly	has	the	strongest	links	with	the	UK	in	almost	all	economic	issues	among	the	V4,	and	
not	only	in	an	absolute	sense	due	to	Poland’s	large	size,	but	also	in	a	relative	sense.	These	ties	give	
Poland	 strong	 interests	 for	 maintaining	 economic	 relations	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 UK	 in	 their	
current	form,	within	the	framework	of	the	single	market.	The	UK’s	departure	from	the	single	market	
would	harm	Poland’s	economic	interests.88	The	Polish	government	has	indeed	come	out	strongly	in	
support	 of	 a	 close	 UK-EU	 relationship	 after	 Brexit.	 In	 December	 2017	 Prime	Minister	Morawiecki	
argued	 that	 he	wanted	 a	new	 trading	 relationship	between	 the	UK	 and	EU	 “as	 soon	 as	 possible,”	
stating	that	“trade	and	economic	cooperation	should	be	maintained	at	the	best	possible	platform”	
for	Poland	and	the	UK.	89	He	also	argued	that	the	freedom	of	service	provision	must	be	maintained	
between	 the	 EU	 and	 the	UK,	while	 also	 acknowledging	 that	 the	 development	 of	 the	 future	 trade	
relationship	is	the	“prerogative	of	the	European	Commission.”	
Security.	 Poland’s	 national	 security	 is	 firmly	 grounded	 in	 the	 framework	 of	 NATO.	 However,	 the	
external	military	actions	of	Russia,	as	well	as	its	increased	use	of	propaganda	and	disinformation	in	
the	 past	 decade	 have	 been	 a	 source	 of	 worry	 for	 Poland.	 The	 governing	 PiS	 party	 has	 generally	
tended	to	view	Russia	with	hostility.	Poland	is	also	the	only	V4	country	to	have	a	 land	border	with	
Russia.	 These	 issues	 have	 given	 Poland	 incentives	 to	 ensure	 that	 NATO	 remains	 committed	 to	
security	 in	 the	 region.	To	ensure	 this,	Poland	has	developed	a	close	bilateral	 relationship	with	 the	
USA	within	NATO,	which	includes	hosting	American	troops	and	equipment	in	Poland,	concentrated	
along	the	border	with	the	Russian	enclave	of	Kaliningrad.90		
The	UK’s	departure	will	be	strongly	felt	in	Poland	on	security	issues,	and	it	may	also	cause	a	shift	in	
the	EU’s	attitudes	towards	Russia.91	The	UK	and	Poland	both	view	Russia	as	a	threat	to	Europe,	and	
have	taken	a	relatively	hard	line	regarding	sanctions	against	it.	The	loss	of	the	UK	will	mean	that	the	
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balance	 of	 power	 within	 the	 EU	 may	 tilt	 towards	 countries	 which	 have	 appeared	 to	 be	 more	
pragmatic	 towards	 Russia,	 such	 as	 France,	 Italy,	 and	 even	 Germany.92	 As	 mentioned,	 Poland	 has	
concluded	a	defence	treaty	with	the	UK	in	December	2017,	which	puts	it	in	a	unique	position	among	
the	 V4.	 The	 treaty	 is	 not	 meant	 to	 duplicate	 any	 kind	 of	 cooperation	 already	 under	 way	 in	 the	
framework	of	NATO,	but	rather	to	strengthen	existing	ties	further,	and	add	an	element	of	defence	
industry	cooperation.	The	UK	has	also	deployed	150	troops,	along	with	the	contribution	of	the	USA,	
along	 the	 Polish	 border	 with	 Kaliningrad.	 The	 treaty	 is	 also	 aimed	 at	 improving	 cooperation	 to	
identify	and	counter	Russian	disinformation.93	These	actions	seem	to	indicate	that	Poland	does	not	
fully	 trust	 the	 UK	 to	 remain	 engaged	with	 European	 security,	 and	 is	 looking	 for	 bilateral	ways	 to	
ensure	commitment.	Britain	on	the	other	hand	seems	to	be	using	defence	cooperation	to	secure	the	
support	of	Poland	in	reaching	a	favourable	trade	deal	with	the	EU.	
Institutional	aspects.	Given	Poland’s	strong	political	and	economic	ties	with	the	UK,	it	is	interested	in	
findings	ways	to	ensure	that	the	UK	remains	a	participant	 in	certain	European	policies	after	Brexit.	
Beyond	keeping	the	UK	in	the	single	market	and	committed	to	the	security	of	the	Eastern	member	
states,	Poland	has	been	an	ally	of	 the	UK	 in	areas	 like	deregulation,	 greater	 freedom	 for	 services,	
labour	market	flexibility,	and	digital	regulation.	Energy	security	 is	also	a	key	policy	area	for	Poland,	
and	 has	 lobbied	 together	 with	 the	 UK	 for	 the	 development	 of	 a	 European	 energy	 grid.	 These	
considerations	 may	 make	 Poland	 support	 some	 form	 of	 post-Brexit	 relationship	 in	 which	 the	 UK	
takes	part	 in	 these	policies.94	However,	 the	mechanisms	through	which	such	cooperation	could	be	
possible	 are	 as	 yet	 unclear,	 and	 Polish	 officials	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 have	 given	 them	much	 practical	
consideration.	
	
4.3.3.  Pol ish interests  on Brexit- induced changes in  the UK 
Poland	has	lost	the	largest	share	of	its	population	to	immigration	to	the	UK	among	the	V4,	and	there	
is	 a	 clear	 push	 from	 the	 government	 to	 encourage	 Poles	 to	 return.95	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 British	
government	aims	to	leave	the	single	market	and	thus	end	free	movement	can	thus	be	welcome	by	
the	Polish	government,	as	it	will	make	emigration	much	more	difficult	for	Poles	after	Brexit.	Beyond	
the	new	immigration	regime	for	EU	nationals,	Polish	officials	have	expressed	little	interest	towards	
institutional	changes	in	the	UK.	They	seem	to	have	been	relatively	neutral	towards	the	question	of	
Scottish	independence.96	Poles	in	Northern	Ireland	make	up	the	largest	minority	in	the	region,97	and	
Polish	officials	supported	the	common	EU	position	on	the	question	of	the	Irish	border	during	the	first	
phase	of	the	negotiations.	
	
4.3.4.  Pol ish interests  on EU level  changes caused by Brexit  
The	Polish	government	is	generally	not	in	favour	of	deeper	integration,	and	argues	that	the	EU	needs	
to	 solve	 its	 current	 problems	 before	 this	 can	 be	 possible.	 These	 problems,	 according	 to	 the	
government,	include	the	weak	legitimacy	of	the	EU,	the	Commission	becoming	far	too	active	at	the	
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expense	of	the	Council	and	the	member	states,	the	lack	of	consensual	decision	making,	and	the	large	
disparities	 in	development	within	 the	Union.98	Poland	also	sees	 threats	 in	multi-speed	 integration,	
for	example	former	Prime	Minister	Beata	Szydło	has	argued	that	it	could	lead	to	the	unfair	exclusion	
of	certain	member	states,	and	has	stated	that	if	“areas	of	deepened	integration	are	to	be	created	in	
a	 narrower	 group	of	 countries,	 they	must	 remain	 open	 for	 others,	who	may	wish	 to	 join	 later.”99	
President	 Andrzej	 Duda	 has	 also	 argued	 that	 the	 EU	 needs	 to	maintain	 unity	 and	 organizational,	
legal,	market	or	budgetary	duality	cannot	arise.100		
However,	there	are	exceptions.	Poland	has	been	supportive	about	greater	integration	in	the	fields	of	
defence	 and	 internal	 security,	 and	 is	 open	 to	 enhancing	 European	 defence	 capabilities.	 However,	
these	must	not	double	NATO’s	security	structure	or	undermine	it	in	any	way.	While	internal	security	
is	 primarily	 seen	 as	 the	 responsibility	 of	 member	 states,	 Poland	 supports	 the	 development	 of	
European	 capabilities	 to	 control	 borders,	 as	 well	 as	 tightening	 cooperation	 between	 the	 special	
services	of	member	states,	 including	the	integration	of	their	databases.101	Stronger	cooperation	on	
curbing	 migration,	 including	 development	 assistance	 and	 other	 policies,	 is	 also	 an	 issue	 where	
Poland	can	support	deeper	integration.		
	
4.3.5.  Summary of  Pol ish interests  
The	Polish	interests	can	be	summarized	as	follows:	
• Poland	has	the	strongest	economic	relations	with	the	UK	among	the	V4,	and	has	seen	Britain	
as	a	strong	ally	within	the	EU.	Poland	is	thus	highly	interested	in	keeping	the	UK	as	close	as	
possible	to	the	EU,	preferably	 in	the	framework	of	the	single	market,	and	even	developing	
ways	of	including	the	UK	in	various	EU	policies.	
• The	 UK	 is	 Poland’s	 second	 biggest	 export	 market,	 and	 officials	 have	 argued	 for	 a	 close	
trading	 relationship,	 involving	 services	 as	well.	 Poland	 has	 so	 far	 supported	 the	 EU’s	 joint	
approach	on	the	indivisible	nature	of	the	four	freedoms	and	the	need	to	maintain	the	unity	
of	the	EU27,	but	has	been	less	vocal	on	this	than	the	other	member	states.	Poland	has	the	
most	 to	 gain	 among	 the	V4	 from	granting	 the	UK	 a	 favourable	 deal,	 as	well	 as	 tightening	
bilateral	cooperation.	
• The	rights	of	Polish	citizens	in	the	UK	have	been	the	single	largest	concern	for	Poland	during	
the	 first	 phase	 of	 negotiations,	 which	 is	 now	 seen	 as	 settled.	 However,	 there	 are	 voices	
within	 the	 Polish	 government	who	would	 prefer	 that	 these	 people	 return	 to	 Poland,	 and	
thus	 the	 government	 seems	 less	 concerned	 about	 the	 future	 immigration	 system	 the	 UK	
introduces	for	EU	nationals.	
• In	 terms	 of	 security,	 Brexit	 will	 weaken	 the	 EU’s	 stance	 against	 Russia,	 which	 is	 against	
Poland’s	 interests.	 Poland	 has	 thus	 been	 keen	 to	 ensure	 that	 NATO	 remains	 strong,	 and	
unlike	its	V4	peers,	it	has	also	sought	more	bilateral	security	guarantees,	including	a	defence	
treaty	with	the	UK.	
• Poland	does	not	support	further	deepening	of	the	EU	post-Brexit,	and	argues	that	the	EU	
suffers	from	a	number	of	problems	that	need	to	be	solved	before	any	further	deepening	is	
possible.	The	government	is	strongly	against	multispeed	Europe.	However,	Poland	does	
support	more	integration	in	the	fields	of	security	and	defence	cooperation.	
																																								 																				
98	 Szydło,	 B.	 (2017):	 Wystąpienie	 Premier	 Beaty	 Szydło	 na	 Forum	 Polityki	 Zagranicznej,	
http://www.kolonia.msz.gov.pl/resource/a3e69e3d-f608-4e32-89a3-64ca5df778e1:JCR.	
99	Szydło,	B.	(2017):	op	cit.	
100	 Forsal.pl	 (2017):	 Szczerski:	 Polska	 nie	 wpycha	 krajów	 regionu	 w	 antyniemiecki	 sojusz,	
http://forsal.pl/artykuly/1052088,szczerski-trojmorze-polska-nie-wpycha-krajow-regionu-w-antyniemiecki-sojusz-
wywiad.html.	
101	Szymański,	K.	(2017):	What	Kind	of	Union	Does	Poland	Need?,	http://www.ppd.pism.pl/Numery/1-67-2016/What-Kind-
of-Union-Does-Poland-Need-Minister-Konrad-Szymanski.	
31	
	
	
4.4. Slovakia 
4.4.1.  S lovakia and the EU 
After	becoming	a	member	of	the	EU	in	2004,	Slovakia’s	approach	towards	the	European	project	has	
been	 highly	 positive,	 and	 it	 has	 been	 enthusiastic	 about	 deepening	 its	 integration	 with	 the	
Community.	However,	the	country	has	struggled	to	push	through	its	own	goals	during	the	first	few	
years	after	accession,	and	has	acted	much	more	as	a	follower	than	a	leader.	Although	Slovakia	had	
several	 clear	 preferences	 and	 ideas	 about	 the	 development	 of	 certain	 policies,	 especially	 in	
connection	 to	 energy	 policy	 or	 relations	 with	 the	 Eastern	 Neighbourhood,	 it	 had	 a	 hard	 time	 in	
achieving	 these	 goals.102	 This	 lack	 of	 influence	 however	 did	 not	 diminish	 Slovak	 enthusiasm,	 and	
Slovakia	still	belongs	among	the	most	Euro-optimistic	countries	of	the	region,	at	least	on	the	level	of	
political	 elites.	 There	 is	 a	 wide	 agreement	 on	 the	 political	 level	 regarding	 the	 support	 for	 EU	
membership	and	its	strategic	importance	for	the	Slovak	Republic.103	The	Prime	Minister,	Robert	Fico	
has	clearly	argued	that	Slovakia’s	future	is	with	the	“core”	of	the	EU,	and	not	with	the	increasingly	
Eurosceptic	 East.104	 This,	 and	other	 similar	 statements	 are	 reinforced	by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 country	
adopted	the	euro	in	2009,	and	it	is	still	the	only	V4	country	to	have	done	so.	
The	Slovak	Presidency	of	the	Council	of	the	EU	 in	the	second	half	of	2016	started	only	a	couple	of	
days	 after	 the	 Brexit	 referendum,	 which	 brought	 a	 significant	 level	 of	 stress	 to	 the	 Slovak	
administration,	already	overwhelmed	by	preparations.	However,	the	decision	of	UK	voters	to	leave	
the	EU	did	not	derail	Slovakia’s	original	plans	for	the	Council	Presidency,	as	Brexit	did	not	affect	the	
day-to-day	 business	 of	 the	 Council	 during	 the	 second	 half	 of	 2016.	 The	 Bratislava	 summit	 on	 16	
September	2016	was	the	first	European	Council	meeting	outside	of	Brussels	since	the	2010	Lisbon	
Treaty,	and	it	was	also	the	first	summit	without	the	UK.	The	leaders	of	the	remaining	member	states	
discussed	the	future	of	the	Union,	and	the	Bratislava	declaration	adopted	at	the	summit	proclaimed	
the	unity	of	the	remaining	member	states,	as	well	as	their	support	for	the	European	project.	
Britain	has	been	traditionally	seen	as	a	strong	partner	for	Slovakia	within	the	EU,	not	only	because	it	
was	one	of	the	main	supporters	of	the	Community’s	Eastern	enlargement,	but	also	because	 it	was	
among	the	few	EU	members	which	opened	their	labour	market	to	the	newcomers	already	in	2004.105 
Slovakia	also	shares	many	common	positions	across	a	range	of	topics	with	the	UK,	and	has	therefore	
considered	 Britain	 to	 be	 a	 strong	 partner	 within	 the	 EU’s	 decision-making	 mechanism.	 Slovak	
officials	 have	 expected	 difficult	 Brexit	 negotiations	 from	 the	 very	 start,	 and	 the	 slow	 and	
complicated	 progress	 during	 2017	 supported	 these	 negative	 expectations.	 As	 noted	 by	 a	 senior	
official	at	the	Slovak	Ministry	of	Foreign	and	European	Affairs,	“Brexit	will	not	be	advantageous	for	
either	side	–	the	question	is,	who	will	lose	less.”106	
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4.4.2.  S lovak interests  on the EU-UK deal  
Economy.	While	economic	relations	between	Slovakia	and	the	UK	can	also	be	considered	important,	
they	do	not	have	a	crucial	position	comparable,	 for	example,	 to	relations	with	Germany.	Although	
the	UK	ranked	fifth	among	major	export	destinations	for	Slovak	goods	in	2016	with	an	almost	6	per	
cent	share,	its	more	typical	position	was	between	the	eighth	and	ninth	places	in	previous	years	(see	
Table	2).	The	position	of	the	UK	as	an	exporter	of	goods	to	Slovakia	is	even	weaker,	and	it	has	never	
been	among	the	country’s	top	ten	import	partners	during	the	decade	starting	in	2007.	Slovak	trade	
in	goods	with	the	UK	nonetheless	shows	a	very	large	surplus	for	Slovakia.	The	position	of	Britain	as	a	
destination	of	Slovak	service	exports	 is	 relatively	stronger,	as	 is	 the	position	of	 the	UK	as	a	service	
import	partner	(Table	3).	However,	during	a	decade	between	2007	and	2016,	a	downward	trajectory	
can	be	observed	for	both	indicators,	and	the	value	of	trade	in	services	is	significantly	lower	than	the	
value	of	goods	trade.	As	shown	in	Table	3,	trade	in	services	between	Slovakia	and	the	UK	is	more	or	
less	balanced.	Slovakia	is	not	a	key	destination	for	UK	FDI.	Ranging	between	18th	and	13th	places,	and	
the	UK	FDI	stock	being	consistently	around	1	per	cent	of	the	total,	 the	UK	does	not	belong	among	
the	major	investors	in	Slovakia.	Similarly	to	the	other	V4	countries,	Slovak	FDI	flows	to	the	UK	have	
been	minimal.		
However,	 in	 spite	 of	 these	 statistics,	 the	 UK	 is	 still	 considered	 an	 important	 partner	 in	 economic	
terms	for	Slovakia	by	the	government.	Brexit	is	followed	very	closely	at	the	governmental	level	and	
much	effort	is	put	into	preparing	positions	towards	individual	issues	discussed	in	connection	to	the	
process.	Beyond	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	and	European	Affairs,	all	other	ministries	are	also	involved	
in	the	development	of	Slovak	positions,	as	Brexit	is	seen	as	a	complex	issue	which	concerns	all	policy	
areas.107	Moreover,	besides	the	Slovak	embassy	in	London,	a	number	of	other	Slovak	embassies	also	
report	 on	 Brexit.108	 A	 series	 of	 interviews	 with	 senior	 Slovak	 officials	 indicate	 that	 two	 economic	
issues	were	crucial	for	Slovakia	during	the	first	phase	of	the	Brexit	negotiations:	the	rights	of	Slovak	
citizens	working	and	living	in	the	UK,	and	financial	(mostly	budgetary)	issues.	
The	rights	of	Slovaks	currently	 living	and	working	in	the	UK	were	the	main	issue	of	 interest	for	the	
Slovak	government	during	the	first	phase	of	the	Brexit	negotiations.	As	shown	in	Figure	3,	Slovakia	
had	 the	 second	 highest	 share	 of	 population	 living	 in	 the	UK	 after	 Poland	 among	 the	V4.	 In	 2015,	
there	were	around	80-100	thousand	Slovak	nationals	living	in	the	UK.	While	this	is	not	a	significant	
number	from	a	British	point	of	view,	 it	 is	a	big	group	from	the	Slovak	perspective,	as	 it	 represents	
close	 to	 2	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 Slovak	 population.	 Protecting	 the	 rights	 of	 this	 Slovak	 community	 by	
negotiating	a	deal	that	would	secure	their	rights	as	close	to	the	level	before	Brexit	as	possible	was	a	
priority	for	the	government.	During	the	country’s	presidency	of	the	Council	of	the	EU,	Prime	Minister	
Fico	claimed	that	Slovakia,	together	with	other	V4	countries,	will	veto	any	deal	between	the	EU	and	
the	UK	that	would	limit	the	rights	of	EU	citizens	to	work	in	Britain.109	He	also	stressed	this	position	of	
Slovakia	 during	 a	 bilateral	meeting	with	Michael	 Barnier,	 the	 EC’s	 Chief	 Negotiator	 at	 the	 end	 of	
October	 2017,110	 and	 during	 a	 meeting	 with	 David	 Davis	 in	 March	 2017.111	 Although	 the	 Slovak	
position	 towards	 the	V4	had	changed	with	Slovakia	becoming	more	ambitious	 in	belonging	 to	 the	
EU’s	“core”,	 the	position	of	 the	V4	was	united	 in	connection	 to	 the	rights	of	EU	citizens	 in	 the	UK	
after	Brexit.	There	was	“natural	coordination”	on	this	issue	within	the	V4	group.	After	the	December	
European	Council,	which	formally	confirmed	the	conclusion	of	the	first	phase	of	the	negotiations,112	
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Prime	 Minister	 Fico	 ensured	 Slovaks	 living	 and	 working	 in	 the	 UK	 that	 the	 status	 quo	 will	 be	
maintained	and	their	rights	as	EU	citizens	will	remain	unchanged	after	Brexit.	
Slovak	interests	towards	the	second	key	economic	issue,	the	financial	consequences	of	Brexit,	were	
shaped	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 Slovakia,	 like	 its	 V4	 peers,	 is	 a	 net	 recipient	 of	 EU	 funding.	 The	 potential	
reduction	 of	 the	 EU’s	 budget	 caused	 by	 a	 British	 refusal	 to	 fulfil	 obligations	 would	 negatively	
influence	not	only	Slovakia,	but	more	broadly	the	“friends	of	cohesion”	group.113	As	characterized	by	
an	official	from	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	and	European	Affairs,	the	budgetary	agenda	was	a	“painful	
communication”,	as	the	UK	was	at	first	not	very	clear	about	its	position	on	whether	it	would	fulfill	its	
obligations	 regarding	 the	 multiannual	 financial	 framework	 until	 2020.	 Later,	 once	 it	 reached	 a	
position,	the	amount	it	was	willing	to	contribute	was	in	constant	flux.114	However,	 it	has	to	be	said	
that	the	changes	of	position	were	positive	from	a	Slovak	point	of	view:	the	UK’s	original	position	of	
contributing	€20	billion	was	not	acceptable	for	Slovakia,	however	the	later	suggestion	of	€50	billion	
was	viewed	 favourably.	According	 to	an	 interviewee,	 this	was	 “a	 crucial	 issue”	 for	 Slovakia,	which	
would	have	had	a	big	problem	with	continuing	the	Brexit	negotiations	without	finding	an	agreement	
on	the	issue	of	finance.	The	final	agreement	on	the	financial	settlement	has	clearly	been	considered	
a	success	by	Slovak	political	representatives.	
	
Security.	 Slovak	 respondents	 clearly	 expect	 the	 weakening	 of	 the	 EU	 in	 military	 terms.	 Slovak	
Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	Miroslav	Lajčák	noted	at	the	World	Economic	Forum	in	January	2017	that	
security	 issues	 connected	 to	 extremism	 and	 nationalism	 are	 important	 challenges	 for	 Slovakia.	
Slovakia	 therefore	 seems	 to	prioritize	 internal	 EU	 security	 cooperation,	 and	keeping	Britain	within	
this	system,	at	least	on	the	level	of	intelligence	sharing,	would	be	in	the	interest	of	the	country.	
	
Institutional	aspects.	Slovak	officials	have	not	expressed	any	preferences	on	the	institutional	aspects	
of	the	Brexit	deal.	Britain	was	seen	as	an	important	partner	for	Slovakia	in	many	policy	issues,	and	in	
fact	 the	UK	has	been	considered	to	be	a	significant	supporter	of	 several	 issues	deemed	crucial	 for	
Slovakia.115	 Any	 possibilities	 to	 keep	 Britain	 engaged	 in	 EU	 policies	 through	 some	 sort	 of	 new	
arrangements	would	be	welcomed	by	Slovakia.	
	
4.4.3.  S lovak interests  on Brexit- induced changes in  the UK 
Slovak	officials	did	not	voice	 strong	preferences	on	Brexit-induced	changes	 in	Britain.	The	 issue	of	
the	Irish	border	received	some	attention	as	it	was	one	of	the	three	main	topics	in	the	first	phase	of	
negotiations,	and	possibly	the	most	contentious	among	them.	This	issue	was	not	of	key	importance	
for	Slovakia,	and	 illustrates	well	 the	Slovak	government’s	position	 towards	 issues	 related	 to	Brexit	
which	 it	 does	not	 see	as	 a	priority:	 Slovakia’s	 strategy	here	was	 simply	 to	 align	with	 the	 common	
position	 of	 the	 EU27,	 and	 support	 the	 interests	 of	members	with	 a	more	 immediate	 stake	 in	 the	
issue.	Slovakia	thus	showed	solidarity	with	 Ireland,	while	acknowledging	the	problematic	nature	of	
the	 issue.	The	unity	of	 the	EU27	was	crucial	 for	Slovakia	not	only	concerning	the	 issue	of	 the	 Irish	
border,	but	the	Brexit	negotiations	as	a	whole.	Slovakia	has	seen	this	solidarity	as	reassuring,	with	
the	 hopes	 that	 the	 EU27	would	 back	 the	 country’s	 interests	 as	 well	 if	 any	 crucial	 Slovak	 interest	
towards	Brexit	came	up.	
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Slovakia	 has	 a	 relatively	 large	Hungarian	 ethnic	minority,	 and	 thus	 does	 not	 have	 any	 interests	 in	
encouraging	ethnic	nationalism	and	separatism	in	other	parts	of	Europe.	To	date,	it	is	among	the	five	
EU	members	which	have	not	recognized	Kosovo.	Surprisingly	however,	 the	Slovak	government	has	
appeared	sympathetic	towards	the	prospect	of	Scottish	independence,	and	Prime	Minister	Fico	has	
even	 offered	 to	 mediate	 an	 amicable	 divorce	 based	 on	 Slovakia’s	 experience	 in	 seceding	 from	
Czechoslovakia	in	the	early	1990s.116	
	
4.4.4.  S lovak interests  on EU level  changes caused by Brexit  
The	EU	will	clearly	be	weakened	in	the	military	and	economic	sense	due	to	Brexit.	However,	some	
Slovak	officials	have	argued	that	the	integration	can	also	benefit	from	the	UK’s	departure,	as	Brexit	
will	increase	the	internal	homogeneity	of	the	Community.	The	effort	of	the	EU27	to	provide	a	unitary	
response	to	the	UK’s	positions	has	been	seen	as	successful,	and	can	spur	momentum	to	support	the	
stronger	unification	of	the	member	states	at	a	general	level.	As	noted	by	an	interviewee,	“the	EU	has	
been,	paradoxically,	more	united	than	the	UK	until	now.”117	Several	interviewees	mentioned	that	the	
UK	 was	 not	 internally	 united	 when	 it	 came	 to	 its	 goals	 and	 objectives	 concerning	 Brexit,	 which	
translated	into	unclear	signals	and	positions.		
When	it	comes	to	security	issues	after	Brexit,	Slovak	respondents	expect	the	weakening	of	the	EU’s	
position	 at	 the	 global	 level.	 After	 Brexit,	 France	 will	 be	 the	 only	 nuclear	 power	 within	 the	 EU,	
however,	its	army	does	not	project	a	strong	global	image.	Germany	is	very	cautious	in	military	terms	
for	 historical	 reasons	 and	 has	 been	 reluctant	 to	 strengthen	 its	 army	 or	 to	 engage	 it	 outside	 its	
borders.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 these	 tendencies,	 Brexit	 will	 complicate	 the	 development	 of	 military	
structures	within	the	Union.	Moreover,	the	EU	may	be	less	able	to	rely	on	US	support,	and	not	only	
due	to	the	rhetoric	and	policies	coming	from	President	Donald	Trump’s	administration.		
Slovakia	 none	 the	 less	 sees	 opportunities	 in	 Brexit.	 As	 discussed,	 Slovakia	 perceives	 itself	 as	
belonging	to	the	core	of	the	EU,	as	opposed	to	other	V4	countries,	especially	Hungary,	which	have	
increasingly	emphasized	their	disagreements	with	the	core.	Slovakia	is	the	only	V4	country	to	have	
adopted	the	euro,	and	Prime	Minister	Fico	has	been	especially	keen	on	ensuring	that	Slovakia	moves	
closer	 to	 the	 EU’s	 core.	 While	 other	 V4	 leaders	 have	 categorically	 ruled	 out	 their	 support	 for	
multispeed	Europe,	Prime	Minister	Fico,	while	also	critical,	seems	to	have	been	more	pragmatic	and	
has	argued	that	the	Slovakia	must	prepare	for	it.118	He	has	also	commended	the	reforming	rhetoric	
of	French	president	Macron.119	
However,	as	argued	by	an	 interviewee,	the	position	of	 individual	member	states	 in	the	post-Brexit	
EU	will	depend	on	their	own	activities,	and	not	directly	on	Brexit-induced	changes	or	the	results	of	
the	negotiations.	 It	 is	 difficult	 to	 expect	 a	 situation	 in	which	 Slovakia	 achieves	 a	 stronger	 position	
within	the	Community	only	because	the	UK	leaves.	Some	countries	will	be	more	active	than	others,	
which	will	have	a	positive	impact	on	their	post-Brexit	position.	Therefore,	it	is	up	to	Slovakia	to	find	
its	place,	and	although	it	is	striving	to	be	within	the	core,	the	core	itself	will	be	defined	by	countries	
like	France	or	Germany.120	
	
																																								 																				
116	 Express	 (2016):	 New	 EU	 president	 plots	 to	 help	 Scotland’s	 independence	 bid	 by	 copying	 Czechoslovakia,	
https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/685197/new-eu-president-scotland-slovakia-czech-republic-czechoslovakia-
brexit-sturgeon		
117	Interview	with	an	official	at	the	Slovak	Ministry	of	Foreign	and	European	Affairs,	13	November	2017	
118	NewsNow	(2017):	Fico:	Slovakia	Must	Be	Stable	and	Prepared	for	Multi-speed	EU,	https://newsnow.tasr.sk/foreign/fico-
slovakia-must-be-stable-and-prepared-for-multi-speed-eu/.	
119	 The	 Slovak	 Spectator	 (2017):	 Fico:	 We	 cannot	 allow	 multi-speed	 EU	 to	 become	 divisive,	
https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20544533/fico-we-cannot-allow-multi-speed-eu-to-become-divisive.html.		
120	Interview	with	an	official	at	the	Slovak	Ministry	of	Foreign	and	European	Affairs,	1	December	2017.	
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4.4.5.  Summary of  S lovak interests  
The	Slovak	interests	can	be	summarized	as	follows:	
• Slovakia’s	 current	 government	 sees	 orientation	 towards	 the	 core	 of	 Europe	 as	 a	 national	
interest,	 as	 opposed	 to	 aligning	 itself	 with	 the	 “Eurosceptic	 East.”	 Brexit	 is	 expected	 to	
provide	opportunities	to	strengthen	this	commitment.	
• Slovakia	 sees	 a	 united	 EU27	 position	 towards	 Brexit	 as	 a	 key	 interest.	 On	 issues	where	 it	
does	 not	 have	 vital	 stake,	 it	 has	 thus	 far	 simply	 supported	 the	 common	 position.	 This	
approach	is	likely	to	continue	during	the	second	phase	of	the	negotiations.	
• Britain	has	been	a	less	significant	market	and	investor	in	case	of	Slovakia	than	for	the	other	
V4	 countries.	 Ensuring	 access	 to	 the	 UK	 market,	 especially	 in	 terms	 of	 goods	 exports,	 is	
nonetheless	an	important	Slovak	interest.	
• Britain	has	been	 considered	 a	 strong	partner	 in	 EU	decision	making	processes.	 If	 the	UK’s	
participation	 in	 certain	 EU	 policies	 post-Brexit	 is	 possible,	 Slovakia	 would	 be	 likely	 to	
supportive.	
• During	the	first	phase	of	the	negotiations,	the	rights	of	Slovak	citizens	to	live	and	work	in	the	
UK,	and	ensuring	that	the	UK	meets	its	commitments	under	the	current	financial	framework	
have	been	the	most	crucial	Slovak	interests,	but	both	issues	are	now	seen	as	solved.		
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5. Ground for common actions? Recommendations 
for a V4-friendly post-Brexit Europe 
	
Based	on	 the	analyses	of	 the	 individual	V4	 countries	above,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 there	are	a	number	of	
similarities	between	their	interests,	but	also	some	differences,	as	well	as	issues	which	they	have	so	
far	given	little	consideration	to.	Seven	key	points	can	be	identified	were	the	V4	countries	can	work	
together	 to	 achieve	 their	 common	 aims,	 both	 during	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	Brexit	 negotiations,	 as	
well	as	beyond	them.	
	
1. The	power	of	unity.	Individually,	the	V4	countries	are	relatively	small	compared	to	the	UK.	While	
Britain	is	an	important	economic	partner	for	them,	especially	as	a	destination	for	goods	exports,	
they	are	less	important	markets	for	the	UK.	This	means	that	their	individual	bargaining	power	is	
low.	The	V4	countries	have	recognized	this,	they	have	remained	united	as	a	group,	and	have	also	
supported	the	common	EU	position.	No	V4	country	made	any	strong	attempts	to	undermine	the	
EU’s	unity.	This	clearly	paid	off	 in	 the	 first	phase	of	 the	negotiations,	as	 the	UK	was	unable	 to	
drive	wedges	between	the	EU27.	The	V4	also	have	strong	interests	in	maintaining	good	relations	
with	 the	 reinvigorated	Franco-German	alliance,	and	 they	may	not	wish	 to	 risk	any	 fallout	over	
Brexit.	However,	many	 in	Britain	think	 that	dividing	the	member	states	may	be	possible	 in	 the	
second	phase	 regarding	 trade	 issues.121	 The	V4	 are	 unlikely	 to	 be	 the	 causes	 of	 such	 division,	
although	they	may	be	more	flexible	behind	the	scenes.	 	
	
2. Economics	interests.	The	V4	have	a	strong	interest	in	ensuring	that	Britain	remains	a	part	of	the	
single	market,	and	if	that	is	not	possible,	some	kind	of	deep	free	trade	deal	is	concluded	with	the	
country	which	 also	 covers	 services.	While	 the	 rights	 of	 EU	 citizens	 living	 in	 the	UK	 have	 been	
settled	in	the	first	phase	of	negotiations,	this	agreement	may	become	void	if	the	UK	leaves	the	
EU	without	 a	 deal.	 It	 is	 also	 unclear	 at	 this	 stage	whether	 free	movement	will	 be	maintained	
during	the	transition	period	after	May	2019.	It	is	a	clear	interest	of	the	V4	that	the	UK	does	not	
leave	without	a	deal,	as	it	would	have	severe	impacts	on	V4	trade	and	citizens.	Maintaining	the	
unity	 of	 the	 EU	 and	 getting	 a	 deal	 at	 any	 costs	 however	 may	 not	 be	 compatible	 with	 these	
economic	interests.	As	discussed,	the	first	phase	of	negotiations	has	demonstrated	the	power	of	
unity,	and	the	V4	should	prioritize	this	over	their	immediate	economic	interests.	 	
	
3. Make	sure	the	UK	remains	close	to	the	EU.	Britain	was	a	reliable	partner	 in	a	number	of	areas	
deemed	crucial	 for	 the	V4,	such	as	 foreign	policy	or	 the	regulation	of	 the	 internal	market.	The	
UK’s	departure	is	therefore	a	great	blow	to	these	countries.	However,	the	V4	can	make	steps	to	
ensure	that	the	UK	does	not	drift	too	far	from	the	EU.	It	there	is	political	will,	some	EU	policies	
could	be	opened	up	for	participation	of	non-members,	and	such	participation	in	policies	would	
be	 in	 the	 long	 term	 interest	 of	 the	 UK	 as	well,	 even	 though	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 little	 political	
appetite	in	Britain	for	such	arrangements	at	the	moment.	The	V4	countries	need	to	analyse	and	
judge	which	 policy	 areas	 are	 of	 vital	 importance	 to	 them	 in	 terms	 involving	 the	 UK,	 and	 can	
initiate	efforts	to	develop	EU-level	frameworks	for	such	cooperation	after	Brexit,	perhaps	even	
in	 a	 bespoke	 fashion.	 However,	 it	 is	 ultimately	 the	 UK’s	 choice	 to	 decide	 what	 kind	 of	
relationship	 it	 wants	 with	 the	 EU	 and	 whether	 it	 would	 like	 to	 develop	 policy-level	 co-
operations.	The	V4	recognize	this,	however,	they	can	ensure	that	the	door	remains	open	for	the	
future.	 	
	
																																								 																				
121	The	Economist	(2018):	Now	for	the	difficult	bit.	13-19	January.		
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4. Longer	term	divergence.	Keeping	the	UK	close	is	also	important	in	terms	of	market	access.	While	
a	good	trade	deal	can	ensure	that	Britain’s	market	remains	open	for	V4	exports,	regulations	and	
product	 standards	 may	 drift	 from	 those	 of	 the	 EU	 in	 the	 long	 term,	 potentially	 harming	 V4	
market	shares.	Any	mechanisms	for	ensuring	there	is	no	regulatory	divergence,	other	than	single	
market	 membership,	 seem	 politically	 infeasible	 at	 the	 moment.	 However,	 the	 V4	 can	 make	
efforts	post-Brexit	to	develop	specific	forms	of	EU-UK	cooperation	which	work	against	regulatory	
divergence,	perhaps	along	similar	lines	to	the	agreements	the	EU	has	in	place	with	Switzerland.	
	
5. Security.	 Ensuring	 that	 the	 UK	 remains	 close	 to	 the	 EU	 is	 especially	 important	 in	 terms	 of	
security,	 including	 military	 aspects,	 but	 also	 cooperation	 on	 intelligence	 gathering	 and	
information	sharing	(especially	in	the	context	of	cross-border	organized	crime	and	international	
terrorism).	While	the	UK	has	not	questioned	its	commitments	towards	the	continent’s	security	in	
the	 framework	 of	 NATO,	 it	 seems	 to	 be	 making	 some	 steps	 towards	 greater	 bilateral	
cooperation,	 as	 evidenced	 by	 the	 recent	 defence	 treaty	 with	 Poland.	 The	 V4	 however	 have	
generally	shown	strong	preferences	towards	multilateral	defence	guarantees	 in	the	framework	
of	NATO.	They	also	have	interests	in	ensuring	that	any	deeper	European	cooperation	in	defence	
does	not	become	a	competitor	to	NATO.	Britain	has	always	been	a	strong	proponent	of	closer	
EU-NATO	cooperation,	and	often	acted	as	a	bridge	and	a	pragmatic	mediator	between	the	two	
organizations.	Without	the	British	input,	“the	implicit	inter-institutional	arrangement	that	leaves	
NATO	 in	 charge	 of	 Europe’s	 military	 defence	 and	 deterrence,	 while	 the	 EU	 takes	 on	 ‘softer’	
security	challenges	and	those	outside	Europe,	could	crumble.”122	Some	of	 the	V4	have	already	
expressed	 support	 for	 deeper	 EU	 defence	 cooperation.	 However,	 given	 the	 lack	 of	 defence	
capacities	 and	 spending	 in	 the	 EU27,	 which	 cannot	 be	 solved	 rapidly,	 NATO	 is	 the	 only	
organization	capable	of	guaranteeing	the	security	of	the	V4.	The	V4	need	the	UK	to	maintain	its	
commitment	in	the	future	as	well.	 	
	
6. The	future	of	the	EU.	The	V4	are	divided	on	how	to	approach	EU-level	changes	post-Brexit,	and	it	
is	unclear	whether	these	differences	can	be	reconciled.	Slovakia	has	adopted	the	euro,	and	has	
expressed	 a	 desire	 to	 belong	 to	 the	 core	 of	 the	 EU,	 while	 the	 Czech	 population	 is	 highly	
Eurosceptic,	 as	 are	 the	 current	 Polish	 and	 Hungarian	 governments.	 The	 deepening	 of	 the	
integration,	with	greater	 Franco-German	dominance	and	perhaps	 in	 a	multispeed	 fashion,	will	
become	 a	 reality	 after	 Brexit.	 The	 V4	 countries	 need	 to	 develop	 an	 approach	 to	 it	 –	 blocking	
further	deepening	will	be	extremely	difficult,	and	there	is	no	desire	to	do	so	in	some	of	the	V4,	
such	as	Slovakia	and	the	Czech	Republic.	Stricter	fiscal	rules	for	eurozone	members	could	even	
be	 supported	 by	 the	 Czech	 Republic,	 for	 example.	 With	 the	 V4	 not	 fully	 united,	 building	
coalitions	will	be	difficult,	and	without	the	UK,	it	is	unclear	who	exactly	the	natural	allies	of	the	
V4	will	be.	 Implementing	V4	 interests	 in	post-Brexit	EU	will,	among	others	require	much	more	
skilled	diplomacy	from	the	V4,	and	this	is	an	area	where	they	should	start	investing	now.	 	
	
7. The	Irish	border.	The	V4	seem	to	have	paid	relatively	little	attention	to	the	question	of	the	Irish	
border.	However,	there	are	good	reasons	to	follow	closely	the	emerging	border	arrangement,	as	
it	can	serve	as	a	potential	model	 for	other	external	borders	of	 the	EU	as	well.	Many	of	the	V4	
countries,	as	well	as	CEE	countries	more	broadly	have	interests	in	making	the	flow	of	goods	and	
in	 some	 cases	 people	 smoother	 on	 the	 EU’s	 external	 borders.	 Many	 of	 the	 neighbouring	
countries	 have	 little	 prospects	 of	 joining	 the	 EU	 in	 near	 future,	 and	 thus	 more	 open	 (which	
should	not	mean	less	controlled)	boarders	could	be	an	interim	solution.		
																																								 																				
122	Bond,	I.	et	al.	(2016):	Europe	after	Brexit.	Unleashed	or	undone?	Centre	for	European	Reform,	p.	6.	
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